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Abstract
In the rst chapter of this work, I study the sorting of workers to rms, when rm
size is explicitly taken into account. I develop a method to non-parametrically identify
match production function from data on workers' wages and rms' revenues and posted
job vacancies. Under the proposed identication procedure, ordering of workers and rms
is identied independently, and can therefore be achieved using potentially dierent data
sets. The model sheds light on the question of exporter wage premium: exporters pay
higher wages because they are larger, and higher wages are required to support a larger
rm size.
In the second chapter we elaborate on Anas' (2004) impossibility theorem, which
states that monopolistic competition or economies of scale alone are insucient to ex-
plain the growth of cities in response to growing population or decreasing trade costs
(under constant urban costs); cities shrink. To enhance the realism of assumptions, in-
stead of Anas' normative approach, we introduce migration and developers' equilibria and
another sector. Still, vanishing remains robust! Ultimately, we argue that the vanish-
ing mechanism looks realistic and can have an explanatory power: industries, free of
externalities, should locate in small towns. Moreover, the comparative statics shows how
such manufacturing towns gradually decline, whereas other cities do not.
In the last chapter, to enrich the usual monopolistic competition model, we combine it
with a space of product characteristics, i.e., consumers' ideal varieties. Unlike Hotelling,
in our partially localized competition, zones of service among continuously distributed pro-
ducers intersect due to love for variety. When the equilibrium density of rms is uniform,
it reacts positively to growing market size (population), similarly to non-localized mo-
nopolistic competition. However, positive/negative price reaction is now determined by
increasing/decreasing elasticity of elementary utility (instead of demand elasticity as in
non-localized competition). The rm's range of service is a new notion introduced in this
work. When a rm does not serve all the consumers, the range of service decreases with




V první kapitole této práce studuji zp·sob, jakým se pracovníci t°ídí do rem, p°i£emº
je explicitn¥ brána v potaz velikost rmy. Vytvo°il jsem metodu, kterou lze neparamet-
ricky identikovat párovací produk£ní funkci z údaj· o mzdách pracovník· a výnos· a
volných pracovních míst rem. Podle navrhované identika£ní metody °azení pracov-
ník· a rem je identikováno nezávisle, a proto m·ºe být dosaºeno pouºitím potenciáln¥
r·zných datových soubor·. Tento model vrhá sv¥tlo na otázku mzdové prémie vývozc·:
vývozci platí vy²²í mzdy, protoºe jsou v¥t²í, kde v¥t²í mzdy jsou vyºadovány pro podporu
v¥t²í velikosti rmy.
Ve druhé kapitole rozpracováváme Anas·v (2004) teorém impossibility, který praví, ºe
pouhá monopolistická konkurence nebo výnosy z rozsahu samy o sob¥ nesta£í k vysv¥tlení
r·stu m¥st v reakci na rostoucí populaci nebo pokles obchodních náklad· (p°i konstant-
ních m¥stských nákladech); m¥sta se zmen²ují. Pro v¥t²í realisti£nost p°edpoklad· p°ed-
stavíme migraci nebo vývojá°ské rovnováhy a dal²í sektor namísto Anasova normativního
p°ístupu. Výsledek mizících m¥st p°esto p°etrvává! Nakonec polemizujeme, ºe mecha-
nizmus mizení vypadá realisticky a m·ºe mít vypovídací hodnotu: pr·mysly, které ne-
mají ºádné externality, by se m¥li usadit v malých m¥stech. Komparativní statika navíc
ukazuje, jak se taková pr·myslová m¥sta postupn¥ zmen²ují, zatímco ostatní m¥sta ne.
V poslední kapitole obohacujeme obvyklý model monopolistické konkurence o prostor
charakteristik produkt·, tzn. ideál· jednotlivých spot°ebitel·. Narozdíl od Hotellingova
modelu, v na²í £sáte£n¥ lokalizované konkurenci se zóny sluºeb mezi spojit¥ rozloºenými
producenty neprotínají díky touze po rozmanitosti. V p°ípad¥, kdy je rovnováºná hustota
rem rovnom¥rná, reaguje pozitivn¥ na rostoucí velikost trhu (populaci), podobn¥ jako
v nelokalizované verzi monopolistické konkurence. Nicmén¥, pozitivní/negativní reakce
ceny je nyní ur£ována rostoucí/klesající elasticitou elementárního uºitku (namísto elas-
ticity poptávky v nelokalizované konkurenci). Novým zam¥°ením studie je také rozsah
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My dissertation is titled Essays in Economic Theory", and although the three chap-
ters dier substantially in their topic and focus, two unifying themes permeate the dis-
sertation: one is conceptual, the other is instrumental.
On the conceptual level, the dissertation is focused on the dierent instances of market
frictions. Since my acquaintance with the Welfare Theorems, I have become at the
same time fascinated with and amused by the idea that under certain conditions market
systems deliver the rst-best allocation. My fascination comes from the elegance of the
argument and the unanticipated connection between the self-interested agents premise
and its welfare implication. My amusement reposes on the further inference that uniform
applicability of this result should have left economists, both in academia and policy-
making, unemployed and even unemployable. These and similar ideas fed my interest
in studying market imperfections from the early stages of my career, and brought me
to the understanding that, to a large extent, Economic Theory is a theory of frictional
interactions and market failures.
The methodological tool that connects the three chapters is the theory of monopolistic
competition. That it can be considered a theory of market failure can partially explain
my passion for it. When I learned the monopolistic competition theory during my master
studies, it immediately struck me as an appealing concept for modeling a wide range of
markets. The simultaneous presence of local market power, and the absence of direct
strategic interactions seemed to me a natural proxy description of the supply side of the
economy. For that reason, whenever faced with modeling a market, I always started with
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the monopolistic competition approach, and it has always served me well so far.
Therefore, each essay of my dissertation can be viewed as an applied study of market
frictions and their impact on the equilibrium allocations: on the labor market, in economic
geography and in industrial organization.
In the rst chapter I study matching of workers and rms on the labor market when
both sides of the market are heterogeneous and the search process is impeded by fric-
tions. In contrast to the large body of literature, which relies on a one-to-one matching
framework and equates jobs to rms, I explicitly take into account rm size and the rm's
ability to choose not only the type, but also the number, of workers it wants to employ.
I develop a procedure that allows for non-parametric identication of match production
function and vacancy creation cost function from workers' wages and rms' revenues and
prots. An important insight from the developed model is that disregard of rm size
leads to underestimation of the complementarity between the ability of workers and the
productivity of rms, and therefore, of potential output gains from better sorting. In
addition, I extend the model into the international trade setting to address the question
of the exporting wage premium  an empirical observation that exporting rms tend to
pay higher wages. In my model, exporters pay higher wages due to the size eect  they
are larger, and under search frictions, higher wages are required to support larger rm
size.
In the second chapter (jointly with Sergey Kokovin), we study what monopolistic
competition has to say about the evolution of city sizes. We focus on the question of
whether internal economies of scale, juxtaposed with the interplay between congestion
costs within cities and transportation costs between them, can generate increasing city
size, when the population of the system is growing and creation of cities is endogenous.
Our answer is negative. We show that, by themselves, internal economies of scale, often
assumed to be a characteristic feature of manufacturing industries, do not lead to the cre-
ation of diverse cities, but quite the opposite  in a growing world, cities specialize. This
result is robust to dierent mechanisms behind the city size determination,  whether
these are free movement or a benevolent local mayor, and to the presence of large service
cities in the system. The chapter has recently appeared in Papers in Regional Science.
The last chapter (jointly with Sergey Kokovin and Takatoshi Tabuchi) is focused on
the properties of monopolistic competition in product characteristics space. To enrich
the standard model of monopolistic competition, we introduce a space of product char-
acteristics akin to the early Hotteling (1929) approach. However, unlike Hotteling and
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the following literature, we maintain a love for variety assumption among consumers,
which is central to the modern monopolistic competition literature. This combination
of an ideal type" of product and love for variety in consumption gives rise to partially
localized competition: zones of service of dierent rms intersect. We show that compe-
tition intensity, measured as number of rms and the marginal utility of money, increase
with growing market size, similar to a standard model of spaceless monopolistic compe-
tition. However, the price decreases (increases) if elasticity of utility (instead of demand
elasticity in spaceless competition) at the point of consumption of an ideal variety" is
a decreasing (increasing) function. This result stems from the aggregation of heteroge-
neous consumers into a demand function faced by a rm  aggregate demand does not
inherit all the properties of individual demands. In addition, we show that with increas-
ing market size, competition becomes more localized: the segment of space served by a




Sorting When Firms Have Size
1.1 Introduction
The increasing availability of detailed micro level data sets has made us well informed
about the large extent of heterogeneity on both sides of the labor market. Recent re-
search has shown that rms dier by size, productivity, capital intensity and many other
characteristics. More importantly, the dierences are enormous even within narrowly
dened industries (Crozet and Trionfetti, 2013); or in other words, a large proportion of
these dierences can hardly be attributed to any observable characteristic of rms. This
suggests that unobserved rm characteristics play an important role in any explanation
of rm behavior and outcomes. A similar observation holds for workers. Studies of wage
determination and wage inequality have revealed that wage inequality has been growing
in recent decades in virtually all countries, and that most of the inequality and its growth
cannot be attributed to observable characteristics of workers, even in narrowly dened
occupation-sector cells (see, for example, Helpman, Itskhoki, Muendler and Redding,
2012). Therefore, a study of the labor market cannot disregard the heterogeneity in, and
interplay between, the unobserved characteristics of both rms and workers.
How does this enormous heterogeneity in the labor market play out in the interac-
tion between its two sides  rms and workers? Are there strong complementarities in
production between characteristics of workers and rms? How smooth or frictional is
the process of reallocation? Does the market allocate workers to employers in optimal
fashion? If it does not, what is the role of dierent sources of misallocation, e.g. search
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frictions and market power, and how far from optimal output is the departure? The an-
swer to these and related questions is important for the resolution of numerous economic
debates. Study of misallocation at the micro level is important for the macroeconomics
literature, as it has a direct impact on aggregate productivity uctuations and long-run
income dynamics. One manifestation of this question, especially relevant and occupying
business cycle literature nowadays, is whether the slow recovery after the Great Recession
is due to a mismatch between workers and rms.
Understanding the allocation of workers to jobs is particularly vital to international
trade. There, researchers are interested in whether exporters pay higher wages due to
their own higher productivity or due to hiring better workers. An answer to this question
is essential for understanding the implications of trade liberalization for the distribution
of wages.
In order to provide a partial answer to these questions, I develop a model that features
heterogeneous price-making monopolistically competitive rms, heterogeneous workers
and a frictional labor market. The model addresses the implications of the creation of
vacancies within rms and choice of size for labor market sorting outcomes. In a nutshell,
the model introduces the random search model developed by Shimer and Smith (2000)
into the monopolistic competition framework à la Melitz (2003). Workers searching for
jobs are randomly matched with vacancies posted by rms. There is no free entry of
rms, in contrast to the most standard search models, however, each rm can post as
many vacancies as it needs. In other words, there is free entry of vacancies within a rm.
Production is linear in the quantity of labor, i.e. rm output is a sum of outputs of its
workers. Nevertheless, even the most productive rms do not grow indenitely due to
decreasing demand for their products and the local market power they enjoy.
The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, I show that match output, and hence a
rm's production function, are identied non-parametrically. The identication strategy
I develop utilizes rm level data. One of its advantages is that identication of rms'
unobserved characteristics is achieved independently from workers' characteristics in a
straightforward and intuitive way. In other words, ranking of rms is identied only from
rms' variables, such as revenue and vacancies, and does not depend on the wages they
pay. Identication of the match output function is essential for any counterfactual analysis
that includes shifting dierent workers between dierent jobs. In that context, non-
parametric identication is especially important because of the lack of microfoundations
behind the structure of the match production function. All the more so, the arguments of
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the match production function, i.e. workers' and rms' unobserved heterogeneity drivers,
are not well understood themselves.
In addition, I show that along with the match output, vacancy creation costs are iden-
tied non-parametrically. Understanding the shape of vacancy creation cost is important
because it has potential implications for business cycle models: The faster the marginal
cost is increasing with vacancy creation, the more incentives a rm has to smooth the
hiring process. Thus, convex vacancy creation cost can be one explanation for slower
recoveries.
Second, I extend the model into an international trade setting to show how the explicit
incorporation of rm size can dramatically change predictions about sorting. Exporters
allow for a wider range of quality among their workers and pay them higher wages than
non-exporters. This is in dramatic contrast to the result of Bombardini, Orece and Tito
(2014), who show that in a one-to-one matching framework, exporters tend to choose,
on average, better workers and have less skill dispersion in their workforce. The dierent
result is driven by the rm size eect. In the present model, exporters are larger, and the
cost of supporting larger rm size require larger equilibrium match surplus. Therefore,
the set of acceptable workers, i.e. those with whom the match surplus is positive, expands.
In addition, exporters pay a higher wage to their workers because the wage is positively
related to the match surplus.
Understanding predictions about matching sets of exporters relative to non-exporters
is important because it has implications for the eects of trade liberalization on wage
inequality. Indeed if, on average, matching sets become tighter when more rms engage
in exporting activity, wage inequality will also increase, for two reasons. First, the share
of workers who can enjoy the exporter wage premium increases more slowly than the
share of exporting rms. Second, the tighter matching sets indicate that matches are
closer to perfect and workers' wages are closer to their maximal attainable wages (given
the aggregate environment). Conversely, expanding matching sets downward pressure on
wage inequality.
This paper ts into the extensive line of research on the estimation of models of
sorting on the labor market based on unobserved characteristics of workers and rms,
rmly grounded in theory, such as Lopes de Melo (2013) and Lise, Meghir and Robin
(2013). However, the paper addresses two major shortcomings of the current literature.
First, a large part of the literature imposes a good deal of structure on the model and,
in particular, does not allow for varying degrees of complementarity  Hagedorn, Law
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and Manovskii (2014) being a notable exception. Second, virtually all research in the
area so far has not made any distinction between 'a rm' and 'a job'. In other words, in
these models, rm boundaries are arbitrary, and a rm with n workers is equivalent to n
rms with one worker each. Although theoretically convenient, this approach has a major
shortcoming when applied to data. Since no data set has information on protability or
output of a particular worker or workplace in a rm, the identication of rm character-
istics is based on information about wages and labor ows. Therefore, the identication
strategies tend to be indirect and computationally intensive.
Additionally, the abstraction from the rm size prevalent in the macroeconomic la-
bor literature inevitably misses a potentially important intensive margin of employment
adjustment over the business cycle: expansion (as opposed to entry) of rms during
booms and their contraction (as opposed to exit) during recessions. Intuitively, a rm
that can adjust its labor force size has additional room to maneuver when faced with
shocks, and models taking this into account can produce dierent amplication mecha-
nisms. Hence, the growing literature on the role of rm size in labor market dynamics in
macroeconomics. Kaas and Kircher (2014), Elsby and Michaels (2003) and Moscarini and
Postel-Vinay (2014) develop macroeconomic models that capture sluggish labor market
dynamics, job ows and evolution of the rm size distribution over the business cycle.
However, this paper, to the best of my knowledge, is the rst attempt to explicitly take
into account the role of the rm size for the outcome of the sorting on the frictional labor
market.
Apart from these empirical motivations to consider rm size in the labor market
sorting models, there is also a purely theoretical reason that deserves attention. As Bagger
and Lentz (2015) note, in a one-to-one matching framework, the decision to accept or
reject a match relies heavily on a fundamental scarcity. In such a world, the decision
to agree upon a match is equivalent to a decision to discontinue searching. However,
the relevance of this assumption is not so obvious, since workers can continue to search
for opportunities while employed and rms can have many workers. There is a large
literature that relaxes the scarcity assumption on the worker side of the model via on-
the-job search. This paper can be viewed as a mirror image of that literature. Although
retaining the scarcity on the worker side, I relax it on the rm side of the model via
explicit introduction of the rm's choice of size.
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1.2 Literature Review
Since the seminal study by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999), it has been believed
that one can grasp unobserved characteristics by rst running Mincerian regressions of
wages on observable characteristics of rms and workers and their respective xed eects
using longitudinal linked employer-employee data sets. Second, examining these xed
eects in particular, correlation between them conditional on being matched has been
considered a rough measure of sorting. With the increasing availability of linked employer-
employee data sets, this approach has been widely adopted and applied to data sets from
a number of countries, with a general conclusion that the correlation coecient between
xed eects in worker-rm matches is not very large. Moreover, most studies have found
it to be either insignicant or even negative1. Although in their review of early literature,
Abowd and Kramarz (1999) cautioned that "it is important to keep in mind that it
is not always possible to make a direct interpretation of the statistical parameters (for
individuals or rms) in terms of simple economic model" (p. 2671), the lack of a signicant
positive correlation between worker and rm xed eects has been widely interpreted as
absence or unimportance of sorting.
Recent research has shown that the identifying assumptions of this reduced form ap-
proach are inconsistent with virtually every equilibrium model of sorting, and that the
estimated xed eects do not contain information on underlying unobserved character-
istics. In other words, applied to data generated by an equilibrium sorting model, this
regression approach yields xed eect estimates that have no interpretation within the
original model. The intuition behind this, uncovered by Eeckhout and Kircher (2011),
is that wages are potentially non-monotone in a rm's type: a better rm has to be
compensated for hiring workers who are worse than desired by the rm and therefore,
a linear model is fundamentally misspecied. In addition to the purely theoretical ar-
gument against interpreting the absence of correlation between workers' and rms' xed
eects as the absence of sorting, Lopes de Melo (2013) has shown that the correlation
between the xed eects of a worker and her coworkers is strong, suggesting that similar
workers do indeed sort together.
Understanding the limitations of the reduced form approach of two way xed ef-
fects regressions has led to the development of literature on the identication of sorting
1See Abowd and Kramarz (2009) for the review of early literature, Gruetter and Lalive (2009) for
Austria, Abowd, Kramarz, Pérez-Duarte and Schmutte (2009) for the U.S., and Card, Heining and Kline
(2013) for Germany among others.
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grounded in theory. The starting point for understanding the assortative matching is
Becker's (1973) assignment model with transferable utility. The main insight from this
model is the crucial dependence of the sign of sorting on the complementarities between
two sides of the market: positive assortative matching (PAM)  mating of likes  arises
when the production function is supermodular, i.e. the marginal product of an agent in a
match increases with the quality of her partner. Shimer and Smith (2000), Atakan (2006)
and Eekhout and Kircher (2010) build on Becker's insight and develop the assignment
model to introduce search frictions. They show that in the presence of search frictions
the interplay between the degree of complementarities and the level of search friction is
decisive for determination of the degree and sign of sorting. The Shimer and Smith (2000)
model, being the most natural approach, has become a cornerstone of the literature on
sorting in the labor market. However, one of the limitations of the theoretical literature
on sorting is its focus on one-to-one matching, and its resulting disregard of the role of
rm size. This paper aims to overcome this limitation, introducing rm size into what is
essentially the Shimer and Smith (2000) framework.
Lopes de Melo (2013) and Lise, Meghir and Robin (2013) develop structural models
of sorting and wage dynamics. Estimation of these models suggests that PAM between
workers and rms is present in the data. However, the main limitation of their approach
is the strong assumptions imposed on the functional form of the production function,
that do not allow the sign and strength of sorting to dier along the domain of worker
and rm types.
Hagedorn, Law and Manovskii (2014) take a step further. Building on Shimer and
Smith (2000), they develop an identication procedure that allows for non-parametric
identication of the production function. Applying their framework to German linked
employer-employee data, they show that although complementarities between worker
and rm productivity (and hence, PAM) prevail on average, there are regions of local
substitutability, and that the market exploits this feature of the production function:
reassigning workers to rms in perfectly assortative fashion would reduce total output by
1.43%. However, the empirical literature has inherited the limitation of its theoretical
predecessor, namely, the focus on one-to-one matching. The identication procedure I
develop in this paper borrows heavily from Hagedorn et al. (2014), but overcomes the
limitations of one-to-one matching.
Few papers have studied sorting on the labor market in one-to-many matching frame-
work. Eeckhout and Kircher (2012) expand a frictionless Beckerian approach and show
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that if rms can choose not only the type (quality), but also quantity of production
factors, necessary conditions on the primitives for PAM become stricter. Intuitively,
switching to worse workers is not as detrimental for a rm as in a one-to-one matching
world, since a lower quality can be compensated by a larger number of workers. There-
fore, for this not to happen, the loss in match value must be very high in the best rms,
i.e. marginal match output should change very sharply with the type of rm. The inter-
esting question of how the presence of the search frictions aects conditions for PAM is
outside the scope of this paper. Instead, I take an agnostic stand on the strength of com-
plementarities and a data driven approach: Given the observed labor market outcomes,
I uncover the shape of the primitives.
The only attempt to utilize rm level data in the empirical study of sorting I am
aware of is the study by Bartolucci, Devicienti and Monzon (2015). They use a number
of denitions of the rm's prot to rank rms, and exploit the patterns of movement of
workers between rms to deduce the aggregate measures of the degree and sign of the
sorting on the labor market. Their methodology remains valid in the model I develop
here. Therefore, this paper can be viewed as providing theoretical support, in terms of a
general equilibrium model, to their empirical procedure.
1.3 Model
The economy consists of two sectors: one producing dierentiated intermediate inputs
using labor, and the other assembling the nal good from intermediate inputs. The nal
good is produced under perfect competition. The intermediate good sector is the crucial
building block of the model. Its structure integrates Shimer and Smith's (2000) model of
a time consuming job search and Melitz's (2003) approach to rm heterogeneity.
Firms in the intermediate sector require labor for production. Both rms and workers
are heterogeneous, yet the production function is linear in the quantity of labor. How-
ever, the market for intermediate inputs is monopolistically competitive, and local market
power constrains optimal rm size. Unemployed workers search for jobs in the intermedi-
ate sector and rms post vacancies to hire labor. The labor market is frictional: it takes
time to ll a vacancy and to nd a job.
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1.3.1 Final Good Production
The nal or consumption good is assembled from varieties of dierentiated inputs







 σσ−1 , σ > 1, (1.1)
where Ω denotes the set of varieties available for production of the nal good, and σ is
the elasticity of substitution between varieties. In what follows I assume that there is a
measure one continuum of rms, each producing distinct variety j. Thus, Ω is a set of
measure one. Given the constant returns to scale technology and perfect competition in
the nal good sector, I can focus on a representative rm and its demand for inputs. The
price of the nal good is normalized to one.
The cost minimization problem in the nal good sector is standard. It implies the
following inverse demand for intermediate inputs:
pφ = Y
1/σq−1/σφ (1.2)
that is taken as given by the producers of the intermediate inputs.
1.3.2 Dierentiated Sector
Diverging from Melitz (2003), I assume that the mass of varieties of intermediate
inputs is xed2. Firms are heterogeneous, they dier in their type φ which is uniformly
distributed on [0, 1] interval. Production of a good requires labor, which is also dierenti-
ated. I assume that the economy is populated by a unit mass of workers of type a which
is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] interval3. I assume the following production technology:





2One can introduce an entry game similar to the original Melitz model. However, since the main
focus of the paper is on the labor market, I leave the entry stage out. Conversely, one can always nd
the xed production cost and entry cost levels, such that the measure of stayers is one.
3Observe that uniform distribution of types is not a restriction. Any other continuous distribution
can be transformed to uniform by eectively "renaming" workers aided by corresponding changes in the
match production function. In other words, types are ordinal; they do not measure productivity or skills
per se, but only by their eectiveness in production.
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Here ψ(a, φ) can be understood as the eciency units of labor worker a provides to a
rm φ, or as the standard match output of a rm-worker pair. Then, the aggregate
rm output is a sum of the output of all individual pairs. Although this assumption
disregards potential complementarities or spillovers between dierent workers4, it is in
line with most of the current literature that treats aggregate output as a sum of match
outputs. I apply similar logic to the within rm production, to facilitate comparison with
existing models of frictional labor market sorting, and to highlight the role of rm size
not confounded with intrarm technological spillovers.
I assume that the match output ψ(a, φ) is an increasing function, with the underlying
structural assumption that ordering of types a and φ is meaningful  a higher level
implies a more productive type  and global  being more productive does not depend
on the match partner. In other words, this is a model of absolute advantage in the labor
market. Although restrictive, the last assumption is prevalent in the matching literature.
Importantly, I do not put any restrictions on the cross derivative of the match output
function, since the main focus of the paper is on its identication.
Intermediate good producers take the demand (1.2) for their goods as given. Thus,
the revenue of a rm producing dierentiated variety as a function of the production






Observe that revenue is a concave function of rm output. This feature, stemming
from the demand structure, limits rm size in this model. Alternatively, one can say that
a rm faces decreasing monetary returns to its production scale, and therefore one can
easily construct an isomorphic version of the model  with production function concave
in total eective labor, and perfect competition between the rms in the intermediate
sector.
1.3.3 Labor Market
Now, I turn to the core of the paper  labor market structure. Firms' and workers'
behavior on the labor market is crucial in the identication of the match output function.
4There are a few exceptions addressing intrarm worker productivity interdependence. Bombardini,
Gallipoli, and Pupato (2012) study intrarm complementarities level as a source of industry comparative
advantage. Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2012) introduce congestion into production technology.
However, since production function generally depends on the whole labor distribution within a rm,
every tractable approach to it is bound to impose restrictive structural assumptions.
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Furthermore, the labor market is frictional, and frictions are the only source of movement
of workers between dierent rms, and therefore  the source of identication.
Time is discreet. In every period workers can be either employed or unemployed.
Employed workers receive wage income, and unemployed workers enjoy utility equivalent
to ow income b(a). Firms post vacancies, and unemployed workers search for a job. The
chances of nding a job and lling a vacancy are governed by the labor market tightness
θ, which is dened as the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio. The meeting rate is given by
m(θ) for a rm and θm(θ) for a worker, the latter representing the matching function.
This indirectly implies a standard assumption of a constant returns to scale matching
function. I additionally assume that m(θ) is decreasing in θ and θm(θ) is increasing in
θ, which is equivalent to the assumption that the number of matches increases both with
the number of vacancies and with the number of unemployed workers.
The meeting is random: neither rms nor workers can target a potential partner's
type. The match is consummated voluntarily upon a meeting, when types of both part-
ners are perfectly observable. There is no on-the-job search in the baseline model, and
a worker stays in the match until its separation. The matches are dissolved exogenously
with probability δ.
Households are assumed to be risk-neutral suppliers of labor of a given skill a. They
maximize the expected lifetime income ow, discounted at an interest rate r. Denote U(a)
the value function of unemployed worker of type a, V (a;φ) the value function of a worker
a employed at rm φ. I impose symmetry across rms of a given type, which allows me
to ignore the potential dependence of value functions and wages on rm employment.
The value functions of a worker obey the following two Bellman equations5:
rU(a) = b(a) + θm(θ)
ˆ
γ(φ)max{V (a;φ)− U(a), 0}dφ, ∀a (1.5)
rV (a;φ) = w(a, φ) + δ(U(a)− V (a;φ)) ∀(a, φ) (1.6)
Here γ(φ) = v(φ)´
v(φ)dφ
is the distribution of vacancies across rm types. It governs the
chances of meeting a rm of any given type. It is straightforward that a worker engages
in a match if the value of being employed exceeds the value of being unemployed. The
5Due to monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods sector, rms there obtain positive prots
that workers can potentially have claims on. However, unless these claims depend on the state of
employment, they do not aect employment decisions. For that reason, I omit them from Bellman
equations for workers' monetary ow to ease notation, eectively assuming that a separate class of
entrepreneurs enjoys all prots from the intermediate goods sector.
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interpretation of these equations is rather standard. Equation (1.5) states that the ow
value of unemployment consists of income in unemployment and expected gain in value
from meeting a rm. Equation (1.6) represents the ow value of employment at rm φ
as wage w(a, φ) at this rm and potential loss in value from separation. Generally wages
depend not only on the type of worker and rm, but also on the composition of the labor
force within a particular rm. I ignore this dependence because I focus on the symmetric
steady state equilibrium, in which all rms of the same type have the same labor force
structure.
Thus, the behavior of workers is straightforward: They look for a job and take any
that brings higher income ow. As I show later, this is equivalent to a simple reservation
wage rule. Denote A(a) the set of acceptable matches for a worker of type a, i.e. A(a) is
a subset of rm types a worker a is willing to work for given the equilibrium wage:
A(a) = {φ : V (a, φ)− U(a) > 0}.
Now I turn to rms' behavior on the labor market. Denote J(Lφ, φ) a value of rm
of type φ and labor force Lφ(a). Firms maximize their present value, which is equal to
the discounted stream of prots. In order to hire workers, rms choose a measure of
vacancies v to post. The Bellman equation for the rm problem is:







w(a, φ)dLφ(a)− c(v) + J(L′, φ)
}
(1.7)
subject to the denition of revenue (1.4) and the law of motion of within rm employment





I{φ ∈ A(a′)}da′, (1.8)




is total unemployment. c(v) is the vacancy posting ow cost with c′(v) > 0, c′′(v) ≥ 0.
The change in within rm employment consists of labor attrition due to separation, and
new hires obtained from lled vacancies. I{·} is the indicator function, and the term
I{φ ∈ A(a′)} ensures that a worker takes a job if oered. The inequality in the labor law
of motion implies that a rm can shadow any of its labor force without cost if necessary,
creating an asymmetry in labor adjustment cost. Although articial, this assumption is
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standard in the search literature. It is not crucial for my results, since in a steady state
there is no voluntary match destruction.
Lastly, because hires are not interchangeable with workers outside the rm, workers
have bargaining power. I assume that wages are determined through the generalized
Nash bargaining solution in the spirit of Stole and Zwiebel (1996), thus
(1− β)(V (a;φ)− U(a)) = βdJ(L, φ)
dl(a)
(1.9)
where β is the bargaining power of a worker. Put briey, worker and rm receive xed
shares of the match surplus, with β being the share of the worker. Due to the risk-
neutrality on both sides, the total match surplus can be viewed as a monetary gain of
size S = dJ(L,φ)
dl(a)
+ V (a;φ)− U(a). Here the meaning of derivative dJ(L,φ)
dl(a)
is the marginal
benet for a rm from hiring a worker of a particular type. Eectively, the rm considers
an increase in its value from a match with a worker, relative to the non-consummation
of this particular match. A worker's gain from the match V (a;φ) − U(a) is the share β
(his bargaining power) of the match surplus. This is the intuition behind (1.9).
Note that in general the solution to the bargaining problem would depend not only
on the rm's and worker's types, but also on the whole distribution of employment in
the rm, and, in particular, on the rm's size. However, since I focus on the steady state
of the economy, rm type φ captures all the latter, and therefore, the equilibrium wage
depends only on the pair of types.
Finally, labor balance identities should hold, i.e. the sum of employed and unemployed






u(a′)da′ = a. (1.10)
Recall that the distribution of workers by type in the population is uniform, and therefore
the mass of people with a type weakly below a is equal to a.
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1.4 Labor Market Equilibrium and Identication of Sort-
ing
In this section I provide partial characterization of the rms' optimal behavior. The
established properties of the rms' behavior will be central to the development of a strat-
egy for the identication of the model primitives. As is standard for models of frictional
sorting, I use a properly dened match surplus function, as a gain from consummating
the match relative to the outside option. Then, I describe how the match surplus feeds
into wages and hiring decisions. The established interdependence of surplus, wages and
vacancy creation allows for the identication of the production function from data on
wages and rm revenue.







The next proposition establishes that this is a proper denition of the surplus function in
the sense that matches are consummated whenever it is positive. This can be understood
intuitively: an additional worker brings to the negotiation table the value of his marginal
product, dR(φ)
dl(a)
in ow terms. At the same time, his presence increases output, damping
marginal revenue. This in turn leads to a decrease in the value of the marginal product
of other workers. Hence, the rm improves its position in bargains with other workers
it employs in the period. Thus, the multiplier σ
σ−β > 1 takes care of this pecuniary
externality in the negotiation process. The smaller β, i.e. weaker bargaining position of
workers naturally leads to less importance of this externality. At the limit, if the workers
have no bargaining power, the match gain is equal to the marginal revenue. The negative
part of the surplus is straightforward: the worker forgoes her value in unemployment
and the rm has nothing to lose, since the vacancy cost is sunk at the point of wage
negotiation.
Proposition 1. (i) The hiring decision is governed by the surplus function with matches
being consummated whenever s(a, φ) ≥ 0
(ii) The outcome of wage bargaining yields the following wage rule:
w(a;φ) = βs(a, φ) + rU(a) (1.12)
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where s+(·) = max{s(·), 0}
Moreover, with this result at hand, the Bellman equation for an unemployed worker
(1.5) can be reformulated as follows:





The intuitive interpretation of the results presented in Proposition 1 is clear in light
of the surplus function denition. The wage is nothing but a standard Nash-bargaining
type surplus sharing rule that assigns β share of the surplus to a worker. Although one
should bear in mind that the parties bargain over the surplus over the whole period of
the relationship, due to the focus on the steady state, this is equivalent to sharing ow
surplus every period.
The last point of Proposition 1 requires that the optimal policy of a rm equates
the marginal cost of a vacancy on the left hand side to its expected marginal benets.
Indeed, on the right hand side of the equation (1.13) the chance of meeting a worker,
m(θ), is multiplied by a rm's average share of surplus resulting from a meeting (whether
a match follows or not), represented as an integral over worker types with the distribution
of unemployed workers being the relevant one. In addition, multiplier 1
r+δ
accounts for the
total discounted ow over the expected length of the relationship. The equation (1.14)
has a similar meaning, only from the worker's viewpoint.
It is worth emphasizing the two assumptions of the model that allow for extension
of the job search model from one-to-one to one-to-many matching framework and neat
equilibrium characterization. First, as I stressed earlier, there are no direct complemen-
tarities between the workers in the production function, and output is the sum of marginal
products of the workers. Second, the CES aggregation of the intermediate goods into the
nal good in (1.1) guarantees that the marginal value-product of a worker is propor-
tional to her marginal product, with the proportionality coecient depending only on
the rm's type. These two assumptions taken together allow for neat characterization of
the solution to the rm's problem.
The identication procedure I develop hinges on the established properties of optimal
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behavior of rms and workers. I now discuss how they allow for identication of worker
ranking, value function in unemployment, vacancy creation cost and match output func-
tion.
1.4.1 Identifying Worker Types and Unemployment Value
The worker side of the model is similar to the standard one-to-one frictional search
setup of Shimer and Smith (2000). Thus, the identication of worker types developed by
Hagedorn et al. (2014) carries over to the model presented in this paper. The validity of
this identication strategy is warranted by the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Let the value in unemployment, b(a), be non-decreasing in worker type
a. Then,
• value in unemployment U(a) is increasing in worker type a, and hence, wage w(a, φ)
and value in employment V (a;φ) are increasing in a;
• minimum and maximum wages attainable by a worker of a given type a are increas-
ing in a.
In addition, if for a worker of type a there is a rm type φ that does not hire her in
equilibrium, then the minimal wage she attains is equal to the ow value of unemployment:
min
φ
w(a, φ) = rU(a).
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is quite straightforward. To a given rm, a better




pφψ(a, φ), which is reected
in the wage ranking within a rm. Given the uniformity of ranking within a rm and
non-decreasing ow value in unemployment, better workers have better prospects when
unemployed. The last part of the Proposition states that, if workers do not accept wage
oers from some rms, they follow the simple reservation wage rule in accepting oers
with the reservation wage being equal to ow value in unemployment.
The identication of worker ranking from wage data is based on the derived mono-
tonicity properties. These properties also hold in a one-to-one matching model as in
Hagedorn et al. (2014) and their identication strategy applies. For the sake of com-
pleteness I reiterate their argument in the remainder of this subsection.
If a rm matches with all worker types, the wages it pays would provide a global
ranking of the workers. However, this can hardly be expected, especially if the search
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frictions are suciently small and complementarities in the production function are suf-
ciently strong. Nevertheless, wage ranking within a rm provides a ranking of workers
within that rm. With sucient mobility of workers across rms, one can employ a tran-
sitivity argument. Consider a worker a moving from rm φ1 to rm φ2. Then, any worker
ã with a higher wage in rm φ2, i.e. w(ã, φ2) > w(a, φ2), should have a higher rank than
any worker ˜̃a in rm φ1 with wages w(˜̃a, φ1) < w(a, φ1), and vice versa. In other words,
if, according to wage ranking within rm φ2, ã > a and, according to wage ranking within
rm φ1, a > ˜̃a, transitivity implies that ã > ˜̃a. With sucient mobility of workers across
rms, aggregation of interrm ranking, aided by this transitivity argument, identies the
global ranking of workers in a linked employer-employee dataset.
Two complications might arise in empirical implementation of this procedure. First,
the measurement error in wages can distort the observed workers' ranking within the rm.
To address this problem, Hagedorn et al. (2014) augment the aggregation procedure by
assigning weights to worker pairs within the rm. The particular structure of weights
depends on the distributional assumption about the measurement error. They work
with a normal distribution, imposing independence across workers and rms. Under this
assumption, weights have an intuitive structure: a higher wage dierence in an observed
worker pair leads to a higher incremental value in the aggregation objective function
(eectively Bayesian probability) if they are ranked according to the wage dierential.
Second, the exact aggregation of ranks within a rm is computationally complex. The
results of Proposition 2 on global ranking in maximal and minimal attainable wages help
to improve the procedure by providing an initial ranking that should be close to the exact
ranking (and is not exact only due to the measurement error). Hagedorn et al. (2014)
show that one can initialize the algorithm with global ranking by maximal or minimal
wage, and use single worker moves for improvement. This procedure yields an accurate
solution without being as computationally demanding as the original problem.
The last part of Proposition 2 allows for the identication of the unemployment value
as a minimal attainable wage. However, given the relatively short time span of linked
employer-employee data sets usually used in a sorting estimation, straightforward empiri-
cal implementation could be problematic. Hagerdorn et al. (2014) put forward a solution
based on the fact that ranking of workers is identied. By the continuity argument, sim-
ilarly ranked workers must have similar reservation wages. Thus, one can group together
similarly ranked workers and consider them as being of the same type. This approach
dramatically expands the number of observations available for a given worker type and
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yields suciently precise estimates of reservation wages and unemployment values.
1.4.2 Identication of Vacancy Posting Cost
Insights from Proposition 1 allow for the identication of the vacancy posting cost
function when a researcher has data on the number of vacancies within a rm, in addition
to the wage data. Observe that with a Nash bargaining result (1.12), the surplus can be
identied from wage data:
s(a, φ) = [w(a, φ)−min
φ
w(a, φ)]/β (1.15)
In other words, the surplus is proportional to the wage premium over the reservation
wage of a worker. Here, I used the fact that ow value in unemployment is identied by
minimal attainable wage using the procedure developed in the previous subsection. Now,
I rewrite the vacancy creation policy (1.13) in the following way:
(r + δ)c′(v) = m(θ)
ˆ










with I being an indicator function. The two terms on the right hand side of (1.16)
have direct empirical counterparts. The rst term represents the chances of a vacancy
meeting a worker multiplied by the share of acceptable workers in the unemployment
pool. Together, this constitutes a probability that the vacancy is lled at the end of the
period. Thus, the empirical counterpart of the rst term is the ratio of the number of
new hires to the number of posted vacancies. The second term is the rm's share of the
surplus from a match averaged across new matches. With the surplus identied from
(1.15), it is proportional to the average wage premium of new hires over their respective
reservation wages.
With the marginal posting cost identied, one can test for convexity of the vacancy
creation cost, i.e. for increasing marginal cost. The degree of vacancy posting cost
convexity has important implications for macroeconomic models. Although the model
does not feature business cycle uctuations, the role of the shape of the vacancy creation
cost function in rm dynamics can be understood intuitively. Indeed, if the cost function
was found to be convex, it would imply that rms have incentives to smooth vacancy
creation over the recoveries, i.e. to distribute vacancy creation over a longer period of
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time, leading to a slower recovery process. On the other hand, constant marginal cost
would imply that rms immediately adjust their labor force to the optimal level.
The identication of the vacancy posting cost function depends crucially on the linear-
ity of the relationship between the surplus and wage premium, which is the result of the
particular assumption about the bargaining process. However, in any model where the
wage depends positively on the match surplus, the relationship between wage premium
and surplus would be monotone. This assumption seems a natural outcome of a wage set-
ting process. Therefore, the proposed procedure for vacancy cost identication is robust
to alternative specications of the bargaining arrangement. Although this identication
strategy would not correctly identify the exact functional form of vacancy posting cost,
with wages monotone in the match surplus, it identies a monotone transformation of the
marginal cost of vacancy posting. Therefore, the test for constant marginal cost would
not be misspecied, and would still discriminate correctly between linear and convex cost
functions as long as the vacancy creation technology is the same for all rms.
1.4.3 Identifying Firm Types and Production Function
The main focus of the literature is on the identication of sorting. In this subsection,
I show how the model structure allows one to identify the rm ranking and production
function with the help of the rm level data. Since most of the previous literature has
equated rms and jobs, the identication procedures developed so far can rarely make
use of rm level data. The only exception I am aware of is Bartolucci et al. (2015), who
use rm data to recover aggregate measures of strength and sign of sorting on the labor
market. The explicit introduction of the rm into the model allows for much simpler
identication of the details of sorting outcome from an additional source of information.
I start with the following proposition:
Proposition 3. In equilibrium, better rms enjoy higher prots, i.e. rm value J(φ) is
increasing in φ. Additionally,
(i) If c′′(v) > 0 then φi > φj implies that either Ri > Rj, or vi > vj, or both.
(ii) If the marginal vacancy posting cost is constant, c′(v) = c, φi > φj implies Ri > Rj.
Turned on its head, the proposition implies that the prot ordering pins down type
ordering. Yet due to potential measurement error in or misreporting of prots, the
ranking of rm types from prots alone might not be measured eciently. The second
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part of Proposition 3 provides an additional source of identication that might be useful
in practical applications. It states that ordering of revenues and vacancies identify rms'
ranking as well as prots. The more aligned prots, revenue and vacancies rankings are,
the easier it is for the model to reconstruct rms' ranking condently.
One of the advantages of this identication strategy lies in the fact that two rankings
are identied using dierent sources of information: workers' ranking is identied from
individual wage data, whereas rms' ranking is from rm level data. In addition to making
the identication of the rms' ranking more straightforward and intuitive, relative to the
current literature, it evades potential biases in the sorting estimation, stemming from the
fact that rm type is identied from wages, and hence the types of its workers.
If the correlation between revenue and vacancies is not perfect, but suciently high,
the researcher can use the analogous tactics that were applied in the identication of ow
unemployment value. Firms with similar revenue and vacancies, yet an opposing ranking
of the two, can be grouped together as rms of the same type.
The last step is the identication of the production function. Observe that, using









φ [s(a, φ) + rU(a)] .
From this, together with the identication results developed above, it follows that
the production function can be identied, up to a constant multiplier, from wages and
revenues, by the following equation:
ψ̃(a, φ) = R1/(σ−1)φ
[





Note that the production function is identied non-parametrically. Thus, it allows for
exibility in the sign and degree of complementarity on the domain of function. With
the production function identied, one can investigate the degree of complementarities
locally and globally. In addition, one can ask how much of total output can be gained by
worker reallocation between rms or jobs reallocation (changes in rm sizes), i.e., how
detrimental search frictions are.
The developed procedure for identication of the production function relied on knowl-
edge of the elasticity of the substitution parameter σ. An alternative approach would
be to augment the wage equation and to use a linear-regression technique to estimate
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the augmented version of it. This would allow a researcher to identify the elasticity of
substitution simultaneously with the production function. Therefore, it would provide,
in addition, an indirect check of the model's validity: the estimated value of the elasticity
of substitution should lie in the region agreeable with the literature6.
The idea behind the alternative production function identication is somewhat straight-
forward. Rather than invert the wage equation (1.12) for the match output, one can write
it as follows
ln(w(a, φ)− (1− β)min
φ
w(a, φ)) = χ+
1
σ − 1
lnRφ + lnψ(a, φ) (1.18)
This is a standard log-linear equation that can be estimated with ordinary least
squares methodology. The disadvantage of this identication technique is that it re-
quires variation in the rm revenue on the level of type. In the empirical implementation
any data set provides two sources of such variation. Firstly, recall that for identication
of types we grouped similar workers and similar rms together. Consider a worker-rm
pair (i, j) and note by a(i) and φ(j) respectively the worker and the rm type assigned
to them during the identication. Then the wage equation for econometric estimation
can be written as
ln(wijt − (1− β)min
φ
w(a(i), φ)) = χ+
1
σ − 1
lnRjt + lnψ(a(i), φ(j)) + εijt, (1.19)
where εij keeps track of measurement error in wages. Thus, grouping similar rms would
allow identication of the rm production function and the elasticity of substitution.
However, the variation in revenue at the rm level must be small by construction, leading
to very imprecise estimates
Arguably more importantly, there is inevitable time variation in rm revenue stem-
ming from the business cycle. Although this sort of uctuation is likely to be the main
source of identication of σ in practice, the model so far does not account for productivity
uctuation. More work is needed to understand to what extent aggregate productivity
movement would alter the identication procedure developed. However, if they are small
relative to the labor market adjustment velocity, one can conclude that business cycle
6However, the power of this test is rather low, since consensus on the acceptable values of the elasticity
of substitution has not yet been achieved. A survey by Hillbery and Hummels (2013) reports elasticity
values in the range from 0.9 to 34.4.
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uctuations should not distorte the identication too much.
Observe that the structure of the model suggests a specication of the wage equation
similar to that of Hagedorn et al. (2014), but dierent from the one usually considered in
the literature. Rather than decomposing log-wages into two-way xed eects components,
it suggests looking at the rm specic component of the wage premium over worker's
reservation wage, and not of the wage itself. This is an implication of strategic wage
bargaining at the rm level
1.4.4 Discussion of the Size Eect
What dierence does the rm size make to the production function identication?
There are two channels through which it plays its role. First, the interaction between the
market power and the rm size eectively creates disparity between match output and
its marginal value. The same eect would be experienced in the presence of concave pro-
duction function, which would lead to disparity between marginal and average products.
Second, vacancy creation within the rm might lead to a dierent marginal posting cost
between rms. Indeed, if the vacancy creation cost function is convex, dierent rm size
unequivocally leads in equilibrium to dierent marginal vacancy cost for dierent rms.
However, most of the models of one-to-one matching assume a constant entry cost for
vacancies, independent of their type. Thus, this unaccounted variation in vacancy cost
can become a cause of misidentication of the production function.
To illustrate how these eects may play out, consider the identication of production
function in Hagedorn et al. (2014). Their model is particularly close to the one developed
in this paper, lacking only the rm size component. The separate existence of vacancies
outside rms creates a value to an unlled vacancy, and the outcome of the wage bar-
gaining accounts for this value. Hence, the production function is identied from the
following equilibrium condition:
f(a, φ) =
w(a, φ)− βrVv(φ)− (1− β)rU(a)
β
(1.20)
with Vv(φ) being the value of unlled vacancy of type φ. In contrast to free entry
of vacancies into the economy, voluntary creation of vacancies within rms leads to the
value of a vacancy being equal to its marginal cost within a rm, but not on the aggregate
level.
Therefore, if the data generating process is described by the model developed here, the
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Hagedorn et al. (2014) identication procedure will identify the following transformation
of the production function:
f̃(a, φ) = ξR
− 1
σ−1
φ ψ(a, φ) + (r + s)c
′(vφ) (1.21)
with ξ being a multiplier reecting the size of the economy.
The second summand in (1.21) accounts for the unaccounted variation in marginal
vacancy cost across rms described above. The intuition behind its appearance is the
following. With the match surplus identication coming from the worker side of the
model, and therefore being unaltered by the presence of the outside option for the rms,
the value of the vacancy shifts the identied match output up. Although the vacancy
cost does not enter the bargaining procedure in my model, it would be premature to
claim that vacancy creation costs do not play a role in wage bargaining, since this result
depends on the intricacies of the nature and timing of the vacancy cost, as well as the
bargaining protocol. However, the importance of this eect should not be overstated.
Since this eect does not inuence the cross derivative of the production function, it is
irrelevant to analysis of complementarities, and to the results of counterfactuals that do
not substantially change the distribution of the rm sizes. Even in the latter case, for
this eect to be important, the vacancy posting cost function should bear a high degree
of convexity.
The rm size eect comes from a multiplier R
− 1
σ−1
φ in (1.21), and exactly accounts
for the disparity between match output and its value (or between marginal and average
products in the alternative specication). In other words, the one-to-one matching model
equates the marginal product and its value, however, it identies the latter. Importantly,
this disparity aects the cross derivative of the production function. One would expect
that the multiplier is decreasing in the rm size, therefore, conclusions from the models
that do not take it into account might understate the degree of complementarities between
workers' skills and rms' productivity in the economy. This eect might be an important
driver behind the modest gains from re-sorting workers found in the literature so far.
Importantly, the one-to-one matching model, and hence identication procedure, can
be considered a limiting case of the model and identication procedure I develop in this
paper. In particular, when σ → ∞, aggregation of the intermediate goods into the nal
goods (1.1) becomes linear, i.e. intermediate sector rms produce perfect substitutes,
and rm boundaries eectively disappear. In particular, as can be seen from (1.21), both
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identication strategies identify the same production function (up to an additive shifter).
In this empirical sense, the model I develop can replicate a one-to-one matching model.
1.5 Extension: Exporter Wage Premium
In this section I show how the model can be useful above and beyond addressing the
identication of sorting. In particular, I develop an extended version of the model that
is relevant to international trade.
Since the seminal work by Melitz (2003), rms' heterogeneity and rm size distribu-
tion has become an important explanatory aspect of new trade models and applications.
However, the workers' heterogeneity is rarely addressed in these models. Grossman,
Helpman and Kircher (2013) study sorting of workers into rms in a dierent framework.
They employ the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model, and focus mostly on sorting between,
rather than within, industries. In addition, search frictions in their model do not alter
the sorting pattern. The closest work in spirit to mine is the model of Helpman et al.
(2010). Their model generates positive assortative matching in a similar setup, due to
the functional forms they utilize. Furthermore, in their model, better workers are paid
more only because they are employed by more productive rms, i.e. personal produc-
tivity aects the wage only through the chance of being hired by a better rm, and the
exporters pay higher wages solely due to their higher productivity.
My model easily allows for an extension into international trade because it combines
a workhorse model of the matching of heterogeneous types with the standard model of
heterogeneous rm sizes. Therefore, it is natural to think about such an extension and the
eect international trade has on wages in this framework. As I show later, there is room
for an exporting wage premium even if the exporters do not dier from non-exporters in
their own productivity (type).
I briey outline the extended model here, relegating a more detailed description to
the Appendix. Consider a world of two symmetric countries, with economies consisting of
nal and intermediate goods sectors, as described in Section 2. The intermediate inputs
can now be traded across the border with impediments a la Melitz (2003). The exports
involve xed cost of numeraire fx, which is idiosyncratic to a rm, and iceberg cost τ
common to all rms, i.e. to ship one unit of the good into the foreign country, τ units of it
must be shipped out of the country of origin. Under these assumptions about trade cost,
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symmetric countries and introduced demand structure, the revenue of a rm becomes:





Here I is an indicator of exporting activity, i.e. I = 1 if a rm decides to export and
I = 0 otherwise. Although in this new environment, the distribution of unemployment
and rm sizes would be dierent from that in the closed economy, Proposition 1 continues
to hold. However, though it is hard to track the general equilibrium eects of trade
opening on unemployment and production, one could make an interrm comparison in
an open economy. Due to the idiosyncratic cost of exporting, there might be two rms of
the same type (production function) one of which is exporting while the other is not. The
following proposition summarizes the dierences between such two hypothetical rms.
Proposition 4. Consider two rms, i and j, such that φi=φj. Assume that in equilib-
rium rm j exports and rm i does not, i.e. I(φj) = 1 and I(φi) = 0. Then
(i) qj > qi and Rj > Ri, i.e. the exporting rm is larger measured by output and
revenue;
(ii) if type a of workers is hired by rm i, it is hired by rm j, i.e. rm j has a weakly
larger matching set
In addition, if the vacancy posting cost function is convex, c′′(·) > 0, then
(iii) vj > vi, i.e. exporting rm posts more vacancies;
(iv) wj(a, φ) > wi(a, φ), i.e. the exporting rm pays a higher wage to any given worker
type
Parts (i) and (iii) of the proposition are rather standard for the trade literature.
Since the seminal work by Bernard and Jensen (1999), it has been conrmed empirically
and theoretically that exporting rms are larger than non-exporting ones. The result
(ii) is less straightforward, and deserves special explanation. Start with a hypothetical
situation in which these two rms have the same output. Due to the availability of a
foreign market, the conversion of output into revenue is higher for the exporting rm.
i.e. its total and marginal revenue are higher. This drives up the surplus from a match
with any given worker, and the exporting rm has incentives to expand, both in terms of
vacancy creation and type acceptance. Expansion puts downward pressure on the surplus,
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but does it in a uniform fashion across workers. However, since a larger rm has to create
more vacancies, in equilibrium the average surplus from its new hires has to be larger
as well. Together with the fact that a rm cannot change the surplus from matches
with dierent workers dierently, the surplus from any given match should be higher,
implying a larger matching set for an exporting rm. From this immediately follows the
last part of the proposition, as wages are tightly connected to the match surplus. Thus,
the model highlights the dierent foundation for an exporter wage premium: the cost
of the supporting rm size. In this model, large rms have to create more vacancies at
higher marginal cost. The results of the Proposition, especially of the second part of
it, rely heavily on this assumption. However, as noted in the previous subsection of the
paper, this particular assumption can be tested in the future.
The result on comparison of the matching sets is drastically dierent from that of the
model with one-to-one matching in Bombardini et al. (2014). In a world where a rm
can match with one worker only, exporting increases the importance of a right match,
shifting up and narrowing down the acceptance set of the exporting rm relative to a
non-exporting rm. This dierence highlights how explicit incorporation of rm size into
the search models of labor markets can substantially change the predictions of the models.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper develops an equilibrium model of matching between workers and rms
where rms, as opposed to jobs, have size. In other words, rms make decisions not only
about the extensive margin  what types of workers to hire  but also about the intensive
margin  how many workers to hire. I also show theoretically how equilibrium conditions
resulting from the optimizing behavior of workers and rms allow for identication of the
model primitives such as match output and vacancy creation cost functions. I show
that for the identication, one needs data on workers' wages and rms' revenues and
vacancies, which are usually observable in the modern linked employer-employee data
sets. Importantly, identication of the production function, which is the cornerstone in
addressing the question of sorting, is performed non-parametrically.
The proposed identication procedure permits the quantication of the role of search
friction in its interplay with the complementarities in production and with rm size.
In order to quantify the role of frictions on the extensive margin of hiring, one can
compute the change in total output resulting from optimal reassignment of workers to
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rms, conditional on the observed number of jobs within each rm. Additionally, to
assess the role of search frictions with regard to rm size, one can look at the loss in
the aggregate output relative to the globally optimal assignment of workers to rms.
I believe the empirical quantication of these eects will be an important step in the
further advancement of this line of research.
Next, I extend the model to allow for international trade. This exercise shows the
importance of consideration of rm size for predictions about equilibrium sorting. In
particular, in this model, exporters have larger matching sets than non-exporters; i.e.
they hire more types of workers, in contrast to the prediction of the one-to-one matching
model of Bombardini et al. (2014). In addition, this formulation sheds new light on the
exporter wage premium: I show that the necessity of supporting larger rm size forces
exporters to pay higher wages.
This paper is a rst step in the study of the role of the rm size in sorting on the
labor market. The further advancement of this line of research requires the empirical
assessment of the model and quantication of the role of the rm size. However, prior
to that, the model should be enriched to include prominent features of the data, such as
job-to-job transitions and on-the-job search. First, allowing workers to search for a job
while employed would relax the scarcity assumption imposed on the workers' side of the
labor market in the same way this paper has relaxed the scarcity assumption on the rms'
side. Second, I expect that this extension will dramatically improve the performance of
the model when faced with data.
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1.A Proof of Proposition 1
I prove the proposition by verifying the following guess: the equilibrium wage is given
by:




i.e. the wage is a linear combination of the unemployment value of a worker and his
marginal value product. This leads to a rm's wage bill
ˆ






With this at hand, we can move to the rm's problem dened by (1.7) and (1.8). The


































= λ(a)− µ(a) (1.26)
Since for every a such that l′(a) > 0 µ(a) = 0, λ(a) denes current marginal value of an
additional worker of given type. Thus, the rst order condition with respect to v requires
that the cost of vacancy were equal to marginal gains from it.















+ λ(a)(1− s) (1.27)


















To uncover the left hand side of (1.9), observe that from (1.6) follows:
V (a;L,φ)− U(a) = (w(a;L, φ)− rU(a))/(r + s) (1.29)
We can combine the last equation with (1.28) and (1.9), obtaining
(1− β)[ξ0rU(a) + ξ1
dR
dl(a)







with a method of indeterminant coecients yielding




Hence, the rst claim of the proposition.
With this result we can go further. Observe that (1.5) can be rewritten as






















1.B Proof of Propositions 2 and 3





B(φ)ψ(a, φ)− rU(a) < s(a′, φ)





From this immediately follows that
rU(a)− b(a) = β θm(θ)
r + s
ˆ
s+(a, φ)γ(φ)dφ < rU(a′)− b(a′),
which, together with the assumption of non-decreasing income ow in unemployment,
contradicts the assertion. Thus, U(a) is increasing in its argument. The part about wage
and value in employment for a given φ directly follows from the equilibrium wage rule
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(1.12) and value in employment (1.6). Minimal attainable wage
w = min
φ:s(a,φ)≥0
w(a, φ) = rU(a),
and thus, increasing in a as well. Maximum attainable wage
w = max
φ:s(a,φ)≥0





B(φ)ψ(a, φ) + (1− β)rU(a)
}
is increasing by the envelope theorem.





[YM ]1/σq−1/σ(φj)ψ(a, φj)− rU(a) < s(a, φi)

















If the posting cost function is linear, this is a contradiction. Assumption of convex




The rm value J(φ) is trivially increasing in the rm's type. This follows from the
simple argument, akin to the revealed preference. Consider two rms of types φ′ > φ.
First, rm φ′ can choose to produce an amount of output equal to the equilibrium output
of rm φ, and hence have the same revenue, using exactly the same combination of types.
However, since workers are more productive in rm φ′ than in φ, it will require fewer
workers, and thus will need to post fewer vacancies. The last step is to show that although
rm φ′ will pay higher wages to individual workers, the total wage bill will still be smaller
than that of rm φ. Given the wage rule (1.12), the total wage bill is
β(σ − 1)
σ − β
Rφ + (1− β)r
ˆ
U(a)dLφ(a),
which is straightforwardly smaller for rm φ′ under the described scenario. Thus, I have
shown that rm φ′ can generate the same revenue as rm φ at smaller expenses. This
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implies that its equilibrium prot, and value J(φ′), is larger.
1.C Extended Model Structure and Proof of Proposi-
tion 4
I now allow the world to have to identical countries. Each country is the same as
the country described in Section 2. Final good and labor markets are country specic,
whereas intermediate goods can be traded across the border with impediments. Now,
both home and foreign produced varieties of intermediate good can be used in the nal















, σ > 1, (1.34)
where ΩH is the set of the intermediate goods produced in the home country and ΩF is
the set of the intermediate goods imported from the foreign country. This production




j . In a symmetric equilibrium, nal goods output is the same in both
countries.
An intermediate goods producer can choose whether to sell all produced quantity on
the home market, or to export some of it to the foreign country. Markets are assumed
to be segregated, so that rms can charge dierent prices in dierent countries. To enter
the foreign market, a rm must pay a xed cost fj per period in the market, where fj
is drawn from some distribution F (·) independently across rms. Additionally, shipping
the good to the foreign country involves an iceberg cost τ , i.e. to deliver and sell a unit
of the good to the foreign country, the rm must ship τ units from the home country.
I break the rm's problem down into two steps. First, I describe the optimal way
to distribute sales of given amount q of the good between two countries and how much













s.t. qH + τqF = q
The straightforward solution is to distribute the output so that qF = qHτ
−σ, and
therefore, revenue that can be generated from the given amount q of the output is
R(q) = [Y (1 + Iτ 1−σ)]1/σq
σ−1
σ ,
where I stands for the indicator of exporting. Now, taking into account the revenue
generating function, the rm must decide whether to export, how much output to produce
and what type of workers to employ in production. The slightly modied rm's objective
function (1.7) becomes:







w(a, φ)dLφ(a)− c(v)− Ifj + J(L′, φ)
}
(1.35)
subject to the hiring constraint (1.8) and I ∈ {0, 1}. Bellman equations for workers on
the labor market do not change. Since exporting does not alter the structure of the rm
problem, i.e. it can be solved for each I with revenue function scaled up proportionally
and then maximum value chosen, the result of Proposition 1 applies, and the rm's
vacancy creation policy remains the same. Now I prove Proposition 4.
Consider two rms i and j of the same type ϕi = ϕj but due to dierent xed
exporting cost draws, only rm j is exporting. Start by contradiction. Suppose that





and s(a, φj) > s(a, φi) for all types a. Following the optimal
vacancy posting rule (1.13) would imply that rm j accepts more types and posts (weakly)
more vacancies. Given that the production function of two rms are the same and the
interrm labor force size is proportional to the number of vacancies posted, we arrive at
a contradiction. Hence, the exporting rm has larger output and larger revenue.






, by analogous reasoning we arrive at a contradiction. Therefore, the
exporting rm has (weakly) higher marginal revenue from and match surplus with every
worker. This guarantees that the exporting rm has a larger matching set and posts
more vacancies. The last assertion also follows because wages depend on rm type only
through the worker's share of the surplus.
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Chapter 2
Vanishing Cities: Can Urban Costs Explain
Deindustrialization?
Co-authored by Sergey Kokovin.
2.1 Introduction
Studies of contemporary urban development show a rather typical tendency of many
manufacturing facilities to locate in small towns or rural areas. Examples include many
sectors from food production to heavy industries such as auto manufacturing, Toyota city
being one of the most illuminating examples. Generally, nowadays the physical stages of
manufacturing have become one of the least urbanized activities (see, for instance, Holmes
and Stevens, 2004, or Kolko, 2010, on the comparison between manufacturing and service
industries). Instead, big cities are becoming more and more deindustrialized, special-
izing in exporting services rather than goods. Exportable services include governance
of territories by governments, governance of multi-plant rms by headquarters, research,
blueprint production, education, etc. Small cities, in contrast, rely on manufacturing and
tend to decrease in size. Can we say that the decreasing size of small cities is a natural
outcome of market evolution, driven by noticeably reduced trade costs? We present a
possible explanation of how ... a massive concentration of economic activities within a
fairly small number of urban regions... has triggered a process of counterurbanization
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(Tabuchi et al., 2005).1
Generally, urban theory and economic geography (see, for example, Fujita and Thisse,
2013) have much to say about the agglomeration forces driving both rms and workers
into cities, and about countervailing dispersion forces. Among the latter, commuting
costs, land rent, and other diseconomies of scale understandably restrict city size. Alter-
natively, the well-known Krugman's Core-Periphery model uses agricultural population
as a dispersion force. It predicts that large trade costs can support many small cities,
whereas decreasing trade costs force agglomeration into a few large cities. This view has
become popular (see Combes et al., 2008).
The opposite tendency  evolution towards smaller and smaller cities  is also
predicted by market theory in several settings. Describing competition between two
cities or regions, Helpman (1998) has explored the tension between an agglomeration
force stemming from a preference for variety and a dispersion force stemming from a
limited housing supply (urban cost). Treating two cities somewhat similarly, Tabuchi
(1998) introduces competition for land as a dispersion force. Both models reach similar
results on arising dispersion: equal distribution of population between two regions when
transportation costs become low enough.
More recent advances in the eld leave two regions aside and consider more general
systems of cities instead, searching for their equilibrium number (Tabuchi et al., 2005,
Tabuchi and Thisse, 2011). Some nd both agglomeration and dispersion tendencies
of evolution. Among these studies of city systems, we adopt and modify Anas' (2004)
approach. He studies a normative setting where world (or country) population is given,
and a social planner maximizes the per-capita welfare by choosing a number of symmetric
cities, taking into account consecutive equilibrium. The agglomeration force amounts to
economies of scale, whereas the dispersion force stems from urban commuting costs.
Anas' main theorem describes optimal cities under growing world population as follows:
their number increases but their individual sizes decrease, and eventually drop down
to a technologically admissible minimum, sucient for producing only one variety of
manufacturing good (mono-city). The explanation is that the benet of living in a big
city (close to many producers) decreases when more and more varieties are imported
from other cities in a growing world, while commuting costs remain the same. Anas
interprets his surprising result as a failure of Krugman's economic geography: without
1See also Behrens and Bougna (2013), who report that manufacturing industries are less geographically
concentrated in Canada.
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externalities, a simple monopolistic competition mechanism is insucient to drive the
growth of cities in response to growing populations and/or decreasing trade costs. To
better understand the evolution of cities, we rst check the robustness of Anas' mechanism
and then highlight additional issues: comparative statics of stable equilibria and stable
equilibria with developers (the latter concept appearing potentially useful in other models
of economic geography).
We nd Anas' (2004) modeling strategy appealing and use it as a baseline. In a
centripetal role, production scale economies seem sensible as an agglomeration force be-
hind regional development (see empirical evidence on U.S. regional specialization and
localization in Kim, 1995). As to the centrifugal role, Krugman's assumption of agricul-
tural industry as a dispersion force has been widely criticized as anachronistic. Instead,
commuting, land prices, and other urban costs are perceived as very important for city
residents in modern economies (Tabuchi, 1989). We follow this line of reasoning.
However, we suspect that Anas' (2004) normative setting and restrictive assumptions
drive his unexpected result. Does it remain valid in more realistic settings? Although
Anas' global optimum is an equilibrium in the sense that utility is equalized across existing
cities, it ignores the question of stability, which we are focused on. Therefore, instead
of a normative model with central planning, we explore two positive alternatives: (1)
a stable equilibrium, in which each citizen can voluntarily choose a city to live in, or
can settle in a new city (understanding how production and trade will respond to her
choice); (2) a stable equilibrium with developers, in which each city decides whether to
invite additional citizens or not (also understanding the production/trade consequences).
These two versions resemble two cases in the theory of clubs. The migration setting
resembles the open clubs theory, where everybody can join regardless of the will of
city residents. The developers' equilibrium can be related to a closed clubs setting,
where the admission decision is made by the current members.2 Otherwise, the modeling
remains as in Anas (2004): one sector, general equilibrium, Dixit-Stiglitz preferences,
iceberg trade costs, and a technological minimum for a city size called "village". 3
We start by describing our results with stable equilibria. They are multiple; not
uniquely determined by preferences and costs. Therefore, we study the "zone of equilib-
2We cannot directly rely on club theory, because our clubs-cities are interacting : they inuence each
other through trade, not only through competition for membership.
3Although we ignore integer problem throughout the paper, we employ the notion of the minimal
technological size to have a well dened equilibrium under any parameters. It can be dened as the
minimum number of people necessary to produce one variety of the manufacturing good.
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ria". Propositions 5 and 6 describe "vanishing" cities. The zone of parameters (L, ϕ, n)
admissible for stable cities turns out to be bounded. This implies that cities must dis-
appear in 3 cases: (i) when the current number n of cities grows larger than a certain
uniform bound n∗, or (ii) when the world population L becomes greater than a certain
uniform bound Ld∗; or (iii) when trade freeness ϕ becomes larger than a certain uniform
bound ϕd∗.
Therefore, given other parameters, whatever the historical city system is, growth of
L, ϕ or n eventually causes our city system to abruptly switch to complete dispersion,
due to individual migration. This vanishing eect under migration pressure looks closer
to reality than Anas' globally optimal cities, with both exhibiting a striking contrast to
Krugman's agglomeration outcome under growing freeness ϕ. An intuitive explanation
of the result is the following: Krugman's dispersion force based on agricultural demand
decreases with trade freeness, whereas our dispersion force is the urban cost, and does
not change with trade freeness. At the same time, the agglomeration force is weakening.
Similarly, the dispersion force does not change with an increasing world population, but
the agglomeration force weakens, due to an increasing share of imported varieties in con-
sumption, meaning that domestic production becomes less important to consumers. The
outcome is the same: dispersion. However, besides this limiting case, detailed compar-
ative statics can be more interesting: What precedes the abrupt disintegration of a city
system into villages? Proposition 7 states that, under a growing population, stability
restrictions can cause city size to either gradually shrink or to abruptly collapse.
To obtain additional predictions, we must limit equilibria multiplicity and dene a
reasonable selection among equilibria. Our stable equilibrium with developers imposes
additional restrictions on cities. We assume that citizens are able to restrict entry to
their city, or to attract new residents by granting small privileges, and thereby increase
average welfare. Such collectively rational behavior is represented by a benevolent city
government called the "local developer" or city mayor (unlike Anas' global planner, but
like entities that maximize the price of land by trying to conform to the citizens' wishes).
We explore two versions of such equilibria: "myopic" and "wise", both displaying similar
outcomes. It turns out that the zone of (symmetric) stable equilibria with developers is a
curve N(L) within stable equilibria, bounded near the origin. At higher L it disappears
and the result is disintegration of cities (Proposition 8). Additionally (whenever cities are
multiple), the equilibrium city size gradually decreases in response to the increasing world
population or trade freeness, before dropping down to its technological minimum. This
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version of the model diers from Anas' global optimization in that its local government
ignores the interests of other cities. However, the main conclusion remains the same: the
tendency of (manufacturing, industry-specic) towns to decrease and eventually collapse
down to villages or mono-cities.
Further, for our general explanatory plan it is important to extend our model to two
sectors, with decreasing trade cost in only one of them. This is done by combining two
(or many) sectors with the Cobb-Douglas upper-tier utility. Since the lower-tier utilities
are CES, this guarantees xed budget shares for both sectors. Then, as we show in a
special section, all predictions about a single sector remain valid even in the presence of
another sector in which trade costs do not change.
Now we compare the dispersion result uncovered to a group of models of urban sys-
tems that display similar eects. There are three main distinctions of this strand of
literature from our setup. First, these models have worked with quasilinear preferences,
thus, bear a partial equilibrium avor. Second, the agricultural population serves as a
dispersion force, sometimes combined with urban cost. Third, the production side is
modeled following Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) as "footloose entrepreneurs" (variable
costs are bourn in numerarie but xed cost requires manufacturing labor). In particu-
lar, Tabuchi and Thisse (2006) consider a model with quadratic quasi-linear utility, two
regions, two manufacturing sectors and an agricultural sector, with urban costs as an
additional dispersion force. As a result, when one good is perfectly mobile, the corre-
sponding industry is partially dispersed, whereas the other is agglomerated, thus showing
regional specialization. This conclusion satises our need to distinguish physical manu-
facturing from intellectual production, however, the two-region world is too stylized. A
further step towards displaying asymmetric cities in economic geography is an important
model of "urban hierarchies" by Tabuchi and Thisse (2011). They consider a model of
many manufacturing sectors, each endowed with its own technology and trade costs, and
many possible locations on the circumference. When transport costs steadily decrease,
some cities expand at the expense of the others by attracting a growing number of indus-
tries, while some cities decrease in size or disappear from the space-economy. Though in
a dierent setting (no urban cost), such cities' specialization and related diverse evolution
resemble our conclusions.
We nd even more similarity in Tabuchi, Thisse and Zeng (2005), who consider mi-
gration of footloose entrepreneurs in a multi-regional economy with partial equilibrium
and quadratic preferences as in Ottaviano et al. (2002). Urban cost is assumed to be
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increasing in the city population. When the number of cities is forced to be constant,
some types of cities may grow and other cities simultaneously shrink with trade costs.
When the number of cities is allowed to vary, the city size rst increases (only under
some parameters) and then decreases in response to decreasing transport costs. This
result shows similarity to ours on the decreasing stage. We believe that the possible
dierence in monotonicity under large transportation costs stems from the assumption of
an agricultural population rather than from linear demand structure.
We stress that we study evolution of various cities in a dierent setting: general
equilibrium à la Dixit-Stiglitz, one-factor technology with increasing returns without
xing the world's total mass of rms (presuming it is less stylized than Forslid and
Ottaviano's approach). Thereby we show that the vanishing eect is not the consequence
of very specic assumptions like partial equilibrium and simplied cost function, but holds
also in other settings. Still, the main dierence from the previous approach is that cities
in this model do not include all industries; they specialize either in knowledge-intensive
intellectual products, or in manufacturing. We postulate this feature, leaving any models
with complete specialization that arise as an equilibrium outcome for future research.
Instead, the goal of our study is to show that some industries may become dispersed,
while other industries remain agglomeratedjust because of the simple tendency revealed
by Anas: decreasing trade costs in the former and stable ones in the latter.
Overall, our study generally supports the prediction that cities comprised of industries
lacking intra- or inter-industry externalities have a tendency to decrease and eventually
reach their minimal technological size.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our baseline model.
Section 3 studies migration equilibria. Section 4 deals with developers' equilibria. Section
5 considers two sectors extension of the model, and the nal section concludes. All proofs
are relegated to the Appendix.
2.2 Model: System of Cities with Migration
We introduce a model of a city system very close to that of Anas', except for: (1)
possibly asymmetric cities and (2) a migration process instead of a social planner setting.
We start with the description of the internal city structure and then embed it into a
system of cities.
City. Traditionally, we consider monocentric and circular cities endowed with a Cen-
44
tral Business District (CBD) where production and trade take place. The only production
input is labor supplied by consumers  citizens. Each consumer needs one unit of land
and possesses a unit of time which she spends commuting to her workplace (CBD) and
laboring. The cost of commuting is s units of time per unit of distance, therefore, a con-
sumer living at distance x from CBD spends sx units of time for commuting and supplies
h(x) = 1− sx units of labor for production. Wage per unit of working time in the CBD
is denoted as w.
Suppose there are N residents in a given city. Then, because of unit land requirement,
the radius of the city becomes r =
√
N/π. Given individual labor supply and uniform




2πxh(x)dx = πr2 − 2πr3/3 = N − kN3/2, (2.1)
where k ≡ 2s/3
√
π is a constant, summarizing commuting cost. We denote the average
(per-citizen) labor supply in the city as
θ(N) ≡ H(N)/N.
In addition, we assume zero opportunity value of land and free reallocation within the
city.
Now, we explain how redistribution of rent makes income proportional to the labor
supply. Suppose that the city size is r. We have normalized the land rent on the edge of
the city to zero. Since consumers face the same price vector, free reallocation of consumers
should lead to disposable income equalization among them. In addition, we assume that
the local government collects the land rent and distributes it equally among citizens in
a form of lump-sum transfer. Moreover, independently of the structure and size of other
cities, land rent always remains within the city where it is collected. Thus, the disposable
income of every citizen in the city of size N is
I(N) = θ(N)w ≡ (1− k
√
N)w,
which is decreasing in size.4
4To see details of rent redistribution, see that at any location within a city the sum of rent cost and
commuting cost must be the same. Hence, the rent at any point x must be R(x) = s(r− x)w, and total
rent in the city is TR =
´ r
0
2πxs(r − x)wdx = πswr3/3 = kwN3/2/2.
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System of cities and goods. Suppose there are n cities with population masses
(N1, N2, ..., Nn). There is only one dierentiated good in the economy. Each variety of
the good is produced by only one rm residing in some one city. All cities trade with
each other through some common hub, i.e., transport costs for each pair of cities is the
same. The market for varieties is monopolistically competitive, and entry to the market
is free.
Consumers have identical Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) preferences over












where xki(j) is a single purchase of variety j produced in city i and consumed in city k.
Parameter σ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution. A consumer of type k maximizes





pki(j)xki(j)dj ≤ I(Nk), (2.3)
where pki(j) is the price of variety j produced in city i and consumed in city k. Labor is
the numeraire, I(Nk) denotes income. Taking the rst-order conditions and expressing
the Lagrange multiplier from the budget, we obtain the consumer demand function X(·)
in the form:













with Pk being a price index. It is perfect, as a price of one unit of utility, in the sense
that the indirect utility of a consumer in the city k is
Vk = I(Nk)/Pk. (2.5)
Production. Each producer is a price-maker for her variety. As is standard in
monopolistic competition literature, we assume that a producer has xed labor cost F
to set up a plant and marginal labor requirement c of production. Trade within a city
is costless, whereas trade with other cities requires iceberg transportation costs. This
means that supplying one unit of a good from city i to city k requires τki = τ > 1 units
of the good when i ̸= k but τii = 1. Under these assumptions each producer j in city i
46




[pki(j) − τkicwi]Xki(j)(pki(j), Ik, Pk)Nk − Fwi (2.6)
which she maximizes with respect to prices subject to demand functions (2.4) taking the
price indexes as given. As is standard, under CES preferences, such a prot function is
concave and has a unique maximum. Then, the symmetry of producers leads to symmetric
pricing by all rms from a given city. This allows us to drop index j from further













Free entry into the market drives rms' prot in every city to zero. Combining zero-






Finally, equilibrium wages, wi, and corresponding prices, pki, and incomes, I(Nk), can







= (σ − 1)F/c ∀i (2.9)
Trade equilibrium associated with a system of n cities of sizes (N1, N2, ..., Nn) is




of varieties masses {mi} and vector of wages {wi} such that: (i) consumption values solve
consumers' problems (2.2) subject to budget constraint (2.3) under given prices, wages
and available varieties; (ii) prices solve producers' problems (2.6) given demand function
(2.4), price indexes and wages; (iii) rms earn zero prot (free entry); (iv) labor market
and market for every variety clear.
We do not discuss the existence of such general equilibria, pointing out later on the
existence of symmetric ones (whose behavior under small perturbations we study). Fur-
ther, every trade equilibrium delivers indirect utility Vk = θ(Nk)wk/Pk to any consumer
in city k. Suppose the world population amounts to L consumers.




i=1Ni = L and (2) related trade equilibrium yields the same level of indirect utility
across cities: Vk = Vi ∀k, i.
Naturally, the symmetric distribution of population across an arbitrary number of
cities is a migration equilibrium. Indeed, the case of symmetric cities implies symmetric
trade equilibrium. In this case cities are interchangeable, and utility is equalized across
cities. However, our goal is to understand when such symmetric migration equilibrium
is stable, in the sense that small perturbations are not amplied. Therefore, we shall
consider mainly symmetric (or close to symmetric) population distributions across cities.
Let us reserve notation (n,N) for the symmetric equilibrium with n cities of size N , so
that L = nN .
2.3 Migration Stability
In this section we discuss the stability of any symmetric equilibrium (n,N) against
small perturbations in population distribution. First, we dene two stability conditions
based on dierent kinds of perturbations: migration to the countryside (unpopulated
locations) and migration to other cities.
1. Consider a system of slightly asymmetric cities. Starting from n cities of size N ,
suppose that a new (n + 1)-st city of size ε is created, with one of the old cities taking
size Ñ = N − ε. If in new trade equilibrium indirect utilities Vi evaluated at point ε ≈ 0
satisfy Vn+1(ε) < Vn(Ñ), we say that this migration equilibrium (n,N) is (strictly) stable
against dispersion; otherwise it is not.
2. Consider a system: 1-st city of size N1 = N + ε, 2-nd city of size N2 = N − ε
and n − 2 cities of size N . If in related trade equilibrium incremental utility dV1(N+ε)
dε
evaluated at the point ε ≈ 0 is negative, we say that migration equilibrium (n,N) is
(strictly) stable against agglomeration, otherwise it is not.
When a symmetric migration equilibrium (n,N) satises both stability conditions, we
call it a stable equilibrium.
The rst requirement of stability is that a small shift of population from a city into a
previously unpopulated area does not create incentives for mass movement to this newly
created town. The second requirement is that small movements of populations from one
city to another do not make the target city more attractive. We must add that, in reality,


















Figure 2.1: Region of stable equilibria.
in populations; thereby real stable equilibria could be narrower that what we call stable.
However, our denition is sucient to show that the stability zone is bounded.
Now we formulate the conditions when a symmetric equilibrium is stable in both
senses.
Lemma 1. (Stability conditions) (1) Symmetric migration equilibrium (n,N) is stable




























It may be interesting to look at the shape of stable combinations (L, ϕ, n) from Lemma.
This region is displayed in Fig. 2.1 for specic values σ = 11, k = 0.005. All combinations
inside this shaded area generate stable equilibria, because our Lemma gives necessary and
sucient conditions.
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In Fig. 2.1, we see that the zone of stable equilibria is bounded in all three dimensions
L, n, ϕ. This zone has a complex saddle-type shape; it looks like a hill with a grotto
underneath (see our subsequent gures for details). Our further plan is to prove such
boundedness for any parameter values k, σ. In some sense, this means studying the
comparative statics of sections of the shaded area from Fig. 2.1. Specically, to correctly
resolve Anas' question about vanishing cities, we now describe how the region of stable
migration equilibria changes with the population of the whole system and/or with trade
frictions.
First of all, we simplify the notation by (conventionally) introducing trade freeness
ϕ ≡ τ 1−σ ∈ [0, 1]. This measure is decreasing in the elasticity of substitution, σ, and
higher ϕ implies freer trade. For any number n of cities, the condition of stability against
dispersion can be reformulated in two alternative ways:
(1) given trade freeness ϕ, the total population is bounded from above as














(2) given total population L, freeness of trade is bounded from above as









Similarly, under any number of cities n, the condition of stability against agglomera-
tion requires that:
(1) given freeness of trade ϕ, the total population is bounded from below:








(2) given total population L, freeness of trade is bounded from below:
ϕ(n) ≥ ϕa(n) = 1













In other words, two kinds of stability conditions provide upper and lower bounds
on parameter values under which stable equilibria may exist. Using these bounds, the
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following proposition shows that population growth or trade liberalization (increasing
freeness) must lead to an absence of stable equilibria.
Proposition 5. (No stable cities in large/free world)
(1) Maximal stable population Ld(n) is uniformly bounded from above; i.e., there exists
such Ld∗ < ∞, that any equilibrium (n, L/n) is unstable against dispersion whenever
L > Ld∗;
(2) Maximal stable freeness ϕd(n) is uniformly separated from one; i.e., there exists
such ϕd∗ < 1, that any equilibrium (n, L/n) is unstable against dispersion whenever
ϕ > ϕd∗.
In other words, if the world is large enough or trade is free enough, the only stable
outcome is the dispersion of the population to villages, i.e. locations of minimal admis-
sible size. The remaining question is the boundedness of the region of stability (Fig.2.1)
in dimension n. In other words, we ask whether stable symmetric equilibria with large
number of cities n exist. The next proposition precludes this possibility and, therefore,
gives additional credibility to the vanishing cities theory.
Proposition 6. (No stable equilibria with many cities). Under any admissible parame-
ters (L, ϕ, k, σ), there exist some n̄ such that any equilibrium with bigger number n > n̄
of cities is unstable.
Although our stability conditions reduce the amount of possible equilibrium congu-
rations to a bounded zone in (ϕ, L, n) space, there is still a continuum of stable equilibria
for admissible parameter values. Indeed, any existing city creates a lock-in eect, pre-
venting creation of new cities. This result is akin to that of Fujita, Krugman and Mori
(1999), who have found continuum of equilibria in a city system with an explicit linear
space structure. Fujita et al. employ evolutionary dynamics for selection among equi-
libria, however, due to the complexity of their space structure, they have been forced to
resort to numerical simulations. On the contrary, the simplied spacial structure of our
model allows us to describe all stable equilibria and to provide analytical selection by
simplied evolutionary dynamics.
Comparative statics. How does the system of cities change when the population
grows or trade costs decrease? Do the cities in our model grow, gradually decrease, or
































Figure 2.2: How the region of migration stable equilibria shrinks with respect to trade
freeness ϕ.
Fig. 2.2 plots the regions of migration stable equilibria in (n, L) coordinates under
changing trade freeness: ϕ = 0.05, 0.1, 0.3. In essence, the left panel of Fig. 2.2 contains
some sections of a stable zone from Fig. 2.1 in (n, L) plane. The right panel inverts this
zone into (N,L) space, and the straight line, n = 1, cuts away cases with less than one
city (the same as the vertical line with abscissa coordinate 1 does in the left panel). The
main observation is that the larger trade freeness is  the smaller in terms of area the
zone of stable equilibria is. Specically, the boundaries of the zone shrink towards the
origin, making the stable area smaller.
First consider the direction of changes outside the stability zone: Does the family of
cities move towards stability or towards collapse? The arrows outside the zone show the
migration tendency. In the right panel we observe that above the upper boundary, the
tendency works to decrease size N of a city (which is shown in the left panel as increasing
n = L/N). The arrow in the right side of the right panel says that when a too-large
unstable city decreases its population, it can reach the region of stability. A similar
stable result is shown by the lower left arrow, which is below the kink breaking the left
boundary. Instead, the upper-left arrow (above the kink) in this panel says that, under
suciently high population, a too-small city further loses its population and collapses
into a village. This (upper left) boundary of the stable zone is unstable.
With this in mind, we use this gure to express our intuitions about possible changes
in the city system. To grasp the possible impact of a growing population L on cities
under given ϕ, consider the following thought experiment. Assume, for instance, ϕ = 0.3.
Suppose we start with only one settlement (n = 1) and with a small population L = 2:
Adam and Eve. What happens? This historical point of urbanization lies below the
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critical value La(2), i.e., below the lower bound of related stability zone. So, it cannot
happen that the couple live apart, in dierent villages. Instead, they must agglomerate.
Now let the population grow. Then the agglomeration tendency remains: everyone lives
in the same city. The picture tells us that this single-city pattern of urbanization will
persist until the population exceeds approximately 600. From this point onwards, our
growing population can either remain in this city or try to settle a new one. A two-
cities equilibrium becomes possible when the population reaches approximately 1,100
but there is no force to shift the system to that other equilibrium. However, when the
population exceeds 1,900, any n-city system loses stability; it abruptly collapses into
villages consisting of 1 citizen each (the minimal technological size).
Observe that dierent levels of trade cost make a qualitative dierence. Under ϕ = 0.1
or ϕ = 0.05, on the upper border of the stability region there is a possibility that a
growing population may result in a gradually growing number of cities instead of abrupt
dispersion, at least on the ascending wing of this region (though each city decreases in
size). Generally, under typical parameters, this fairy tale and related picture support
the idea that either gradual or abrupt decreases in city sizes are possible in response to
growing population or/and trade freeness. We formulate this tendency as a proposition.
Proposition 7. Assume that during growth of the population under xed other parame-
ters, the number of cities remains stable until the system reaches the border of the stability
zone. Then, the shape of the border governs the evolution of city sizes: further evolution
can display either gradually decreasing city size or abrupt collapse of cities, but not an
increase.
Proof. In our stability condition (2.10), and in Fig. 2.2, we see that it is the dispersion
condition (not the agglomeration one) that limits the size of the stable world from above.
Therefore, this condition governs the comparative statics. Its violation triggers the in-
crease in the number of cities. From the formula we see that the related city size Ld(n)/n
is a decreasing function.
2.4 Developers' Stability
Although the notion of migration stability allows us to reduce the number of plausi-
ble equilibria and ensures our impossibility results, the remaining multiplicity of stable
equilibria is somewhat disturbing. Therefore, in this section we develop another notion
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of stability as a selection criterion: stability against actions by a developer (local gov-
ernment) who aims to maximize the representative citizen's utility in her city and who
has some power to invite in or push out citizens. Of course, it would be fair to call this
actor benevolent local government or city mayor, but if we believe that the benets
of a particular city structure to citizens can be capitalized in the land rent, there should
not be any dierence between a mayor's behavior and that of a developer. However, this
decision-making diers from Anas' global planner. It also diers from simple migration
 because it considers all intra-city benets from inviting a new citizen in or forcing
a citizen to exit  instead of considering personal benets to a migrant. Nevertheless,
we still impose the requirement of stability against dispersion or creation of a new city,
because the developer cannot force citizens to stay in the city. We consider two cases
with similar outcomes: a wise developer and a myopic developer.
Wise developer. We assume in this paragraph that each developer correctly predicts
all changes in the trade equilibrium that will occur after a new citizen is invited from
some other city.
(Symmetric) stable equilibrium of wise developers is a system of cities (n,N) such
that it is a strict local Nash equilibrium among n developers choosing their city sizes.
It means that there is an ε̂ > 0 such that all possible local ε-perturbations of the city
population (ε < ε̂) bring strictly negative value changes to a developer.
This notion does not consider the possibility of new cities and other asymmetric
situations. By our assumption of wise predictions, the changes in the equilibrium trade
and welfare coincide with predictions that we made when studying migration, because
the wise developer understands that she can attract a new citizen only from some other
city. Further, she expects a citizen to join some other city (not to die) once expelled
from hers. This allows us to show that the new concept of equilibrium is a selection from
the previous concept. Namely, under any ϕ, the wise developer's equilibrium is the lower
border of related equilibria zone displayed in Fig. 2.2. Interestingly, a wise developer
would chose a system with the largest number of cities and the smallest city size among
migration stable equilibria.
Indeed, if the migrant goes out and thereby decreases welfare in the destination city, by
symmetry, she increases welfare in her city of origin. Only when the derivative of welfare
with respect to migration is zero can the situation be a wise developers' equilibrium.
Thus, we come to
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Proposition 8. (Wise developers) (i) A system of cities (n,N) is a stable equilibrium
of wise developers only if it satises stability against agglomeration as equality:









(ii) It belongs to stable equilibria. Thereby, the developer's equilibrium remains possible
within same three bounds: world population, trade freeness and number of citiesall must
be small enough.
Myopic developer. Although the introduced notion is a rational one, we nd our
requirements for the local government to have perfect foresight too demanding. Indeed,
the setup requires a developer to predict changes not only in her city, but in all cities
throughout the country as well. To relax this requirement, we introduce the notion of a
myopic developer. More precisely, we assume that each developer is myopic (boundedly-
rational) when predicting outside trade consequences caused by excluding or inviting a
citizen. This means that when maximizing welfare in her city, she expects no response
from all relevant variables in other cities: population, price indices and wages. Suppose
there are n−1 cities of size N , whereas #1 developer's city has size N1 (to be optimized).
Then, given symmetry in n − 1 other cities, the (trade) equilibrium conditions for price




















= (σ − 1)F/c (2.14)
This form of equilibrium conditions is standard. However, the developer's optimiza-
tion with respect to N1 is dierent, since she takes N and Pi as given. Denote elasticities
of price index and wage (perceived by the developer) in city #1 with respect to local





Denition. We call a symmetric equilibrium (n,N) stable against a myopic developer





0 evaluated at N1 = N and the equilibrium stable against dispersion.
Proposition 9. (Myopic developers) (i) A system of cities (n,N) is a stable equilibrium
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of myopic developers only if it satises the following condition:









(ii) It belongs to migration-stable equilibria. Thereby, the developer's equilibrium remain
possible within same three bounds: world population, trade freeness and number of cities
 must all be small enough.
The established condition for stability against actions by a myopic developer is similar
to the condition of stability against agglomeration (2.11). It diers only by the multiplier
(1−ϕ) in the last term of the denominator. Thus, the costlier trade is, the more developer
stability behavior resembles that of stability against agglomeration (and that of a wise
developer). The intuition is straightforward: cities aect each other through trade only.
Therefore, the higher trade costs are, the less impact a developer's city has on other cities,
and the smaller the developer's mistake in assuming a lack of change in other cities will
be. Moreover, the developer's myopia pushes the system towards fewer cities, i.e, larger
size: Lm(n) > La(n).
Now we present comparative statics analysis of the stability against a developer's ac-
tion graphically. Fig. 2.3 is a copy of Fig. 2.2 supplemented with the line of developer's
stable equilibria Lm(n) and its counterpart L̃m(N). Observe that when the world pop-
ulation L grows, the related point on the solid curve of the developer's equilibria moves
to the right in the left panel. Its counterpart shifts to the left in the right panel, which
describes the same equilibrium in terms of the city size N = L/n. Such behavior means
that the number of cities increases in response to population growth, whereas the city size
decreases.
A similar conclusion follows for trade freeness, only the comparison does not go along
each solid curve, but across three curves. When freeness increases, the point of equilibrium
(for any size of the world L) goes to the right in the left panel and to the left in the right
panel. This again means that the number of cities increases in response to decreasing trade
costs, whereas the city size decreases. Indeed, Lm(n)/n is again a decreasing function of ϕ,
meaning that the new equilibrium must have smaller city size and, hence, a larger number
of cities. Thus, we have come to the proposition which was the purpose of introducing
the developers' equilibria.































Figure 2.3: Developer stable congurations in coordinates (n, L) or (N,L) (under k =
0.001, σ = 11).
decreasing trade cost τ under xed other parameters. In each case, both wise and myopic
developers' equilibrium displays either gradually decreasing city size or abrupt collapse of
cities, but not an increase in city size.
2.5 Extension to Two Sectors
A thoughtful reader has noticed the discrepancy between our theoretical framework
and its empirical interpretation as a divergent evolution of manufacturing cities in contrast
with other cities. Describing the deurbanization of a particular manufacturing industry
among others, we have hitherto dealt with a general equilibrium model with one sector
only. Now, we show how our setup may be embedded into a multi-sector framework, and
maintain qualitatively similar results.
Model. Assume our small-city system remains the same. However, now it also trades
through the same hub with a region called "capital city" (our results would also hold true
for several xed big cities). This city completely belongs to another sector; it produces
some aggregate good S, using its own sector-specic labor. We prefer to interpret this
good as tradable services, including blueprints, research, governance, etc. However, the
capital residents share same preferences as our provincial residents. Any citizen here or
there consumes two goods: composite good U produced in our provincial cities (dened












where Ǔ denotes overall utility of consumption and the Cobb-Douglas parameter µ sat-





pkjixkjidj + PsSk ≤ I(Nk)
that includes the outside good and its nal price Ps, which may include the cost of
transportation to our cities. In what follows, we treat the second commodity S as a
homogeneous good produced under constant returns (another possibility would be a di-
versied good with some CES preferences and price index Ps). Then, spending some mass
Ls of sector-specic labor with unit productivity, the capital produces as much as Ls. It
consumes Cs = (1− µ)Ls out of Ls, because of the well-known two-stage budgeting rule,
resulting from Cobb-Douglas-CES preferences. The reminder of Ls goes for export and,
after iceberg reduction during transportation, becomes the aggregate provincial import
S =
∑n
k=1 SkNk = µLs/τs. Here τs is the transport coecient for good S. Thus, S
is pinned down as a constant. Further, the trade balance between the capital and the






where ysji denotes exports of manufacturing from the province, i.e., our provincial output
net of provincial consumption and net of transportation losses. The prot function of a
provincial rm now takes into account exports to the capital, but no additional analysis is
needed, because the prot-maximizing pricing rule (2.7) remains the same. The internal
structure of our provincial cities remains the same. Our rms and developers take the
price Ps of "services" as given.
An allocation includes: a mass n of (symmetric) provincial cities, a massm of varieties,
a consumption vector (X,S) in each of the cities, a consumption vector in the capital,
and production and prices of all goods. An allocation is an equilibrium if it satises
natural conditions for provincial cities: rational behavior of consumers, producers, and
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balanced budget constraints, plus similar conditions for the capital city (we do not need
to detail the consumption and production in the capital because of well-known two-stage
budgeting under Cobb-Douglas-CES combination: budget shares for both goods in both
worlds always remain constant).
Analysis. Instead of previous indirect utility (2.5), now, under Cobb-Douglas pref-
erences, the indirect utility in any provincial city i is standardly determined (up to a







Now since the shipment of good S is xed, we can normalize its unites so that S = 1.
With this normalization and a citizen's disposable income θ(Ni)wi, the trade balance
between the province and the capital determines the price of services:




We focus now on the stability of manufacturing cities against dispersion to villages.
From (2.17) we see that if a new zero-size town is established, the price of the outside
good is unaected. Further, under CES preferences, the size of rms is xed, and thus
the number of our varieties (2.8) and their prices (2.7) are unaected by the presence of
the capital. Therefore, the stability condition analogous to (2.10) now requires wn+1 <
θ(N)(Pn+1/Pn)














Lemma 2. If the stability condition (2.18) is violated in a one-sector world (for µ = 1),
it is also violated in a two-sector world (for µ < 1).
Indeed, since the bracketed term in (2.18) is greater than one, when its power increases
(µ ↓) the right-hand side increases and the inequality can become violated.
Corollary 1. All propositions about bounded zone of stable migration equilibria and de-
velopers equilibria in a one-sector world (for µ = 1) remain valid in a two-sector world
(for µ < 1). The zone of stable equilibria must shrink.
Economically, due to trade costs, the price index in a newly established small city
59
is larger than that in the old ones, this dierence being an agglomeration force. Now,
in the presence of µ < 1, this force fades due to a lower share of manufacturing in the
expenditure of a citizen. Thus, µ < 1 reinforces the dispersion result. This argumentation
bridges our Introduction with the developed theoretical setup.
Testable prediction. Importantly, the two-sector version of the model sets a ques-
tion for empirical work. Indeed, the comparative statics in µ suggest a testable prediction:
under Cobb-Douglas preferences, parameter µ represents the share of income spent on
manufacture. Recall also (see Fig. 2.3 and related discussion) that the cities' size de-
creases in response to decreasing trade costs, and growing world population. A new topic
is comparative statics in parameter µ. It should push cities' size in the same direction as
trade freeness ϕ, because both work as dispersion forces against agglomeration. Thus, in
a cross-section comparison of industries, one would expect to observe a negative correla-
tion between the urbanization level of each sector and the share of consumer spending on
its product. To conduct this task, one needs to control only for technological dierences
in transportation and employment. Cost parameters (c, F ) do not aect city sizes. To
the best of our knowledge, this hypothesis is novel, and can be tested in future work.
Although we do not explicitly model the reasons for "exportable services" being pro-
duced exclusively in the capital or few cities, it is not dicult to imagine a number of
potential explanations for that. First of all, indivisibilities may preclude dispersion of
specic activities, like large scale governance which is characteristic for capital cities or
major cities. Second, communication externalities may lead to concentration of R&D
activities and education in large cities. Finally, strong complementarities, or the impor-
tance of good matching between two sides of the market may require a thick market,
which is supposedly the case for arts and movies industries in New York and Los Angeles
(see Florida et al., 2012). Combining such post-industrial cities with industrial ones in a
unied framework is our goal in future work.
2.6 Conclusion
We have revisited Anas' (2004) framework that predicts how, in response to growing
population or decreasing trade costs, some cities can gradually decline and disappear.
These are the "industrial" cities, which do not need externalities. To enhance the realism
of the model, instead of Anas' normative approach, we consider migration and developers'
equilibria. Still, the vanishing eect proves to be robust, because it rests on decreasing
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agglomeration force (home-market eect) and stable dispersion force (urban cost). Also,
it turns out to be robust to the presence of other ("non-industrial") sectors in the economy,
which are not aected by decreasing trade costs in the "industrial" sector. Additionally,
we reveal details of comparative statics: how city size changes monotonically with the
trade costs, the population of the world and preferences between the two sectors. In
particular, goods with better transportation technology are more likely to be produced
in smaller cities.
Generally, we interpret this vanishing eect as a realistic outcome a in post-industrial
world, in which many industries indeed relocate to small towns or rural areas. Competing
with other studies of "urban hierarchies" and city specialization, this model is one possible
explanation for deindustrialization. To give an example, our study may shed some light on
the coexistence of large metropolitan areas, such as Tokyo, and small specialized towns,
such as Toyota city, the nature of industrial mix being an important determinant of city
size. An extension of this approach would be a full-edged general equilibrium model of
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2.A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. (1) Consider a city system perturbed by a new small city of
size ε, (n+1, N,N, ..., N − ε, ε). Since rst n− 1 cities are symmetric, we concentrate on
trade equilibrium, which is symmetric for those cities and take labor in the rst city as
numeraire. This implies wage wi = 1 for all these i = 1, n− 1. Using pricing rule (2.7)
that uses constant markups, this system has at most six distinct prices (domestic and





















This system can be aggregated into price indexes, evaluated at point ε = 0, so that we























At trade equilibrium, the utilities also depend on wages. To nd the wages, we recall
constant rm size and use market clearing equations (2.9) for varieties produced in n big
cities and in (n+ 1)-st city, which is small:
(1 + (n− 1)τ 1−σ)θ(N)N [σc/(σ − 1)]−σ
P 1−σi
= (σ − 1)F/c (2.22)
nτθ(N)N [στcwn+1/(σ − 1)]−σ
P 1−σi
= (σ − 1)F/c. (2.23)
Taking a ratio of these two conditions, we obtain the equilibrium (shadow) wage in
(n+ 1)-st city:
w−σn+1 =
1 + (n− 1)τ 1−σ
nτ 1−σ
(2.24)
Recall that θ(0) = 1. Therefore, we can rewrite the comparison of utilities in small and
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big cities Vn+1 ≤ Vn as a comparison of real incomes wn+1/Pn+1 ≤ θ(N)/Pn. Substituting
the denition of θ(N), wn+1 and the ratio of price indexes from above we get result (2.10).
(2) Consider a city system perturbed (as in the denition of agglomeration stability)
by small migration ε from the second city to the rst, (n, N + ε,N − ε,N, ..., N). We
apply the same method. There are again at most six distinct prices and we can write the









































































(1 + (n− 3)τ 1−σ)
]1/(1−σ)
(N + ε)θ(N + ε)w1[σcw1/(σ − 1)]−σ
P 1−σ1
+
τ(N − ε)θ(N − ε)w2[στcw1/(σ − 1)]−σ
P 1−σ2
+(n− 2)τNθ(N)[στcw1/(σ − 1)]
−σ
P 1−σi
= (σ − 1)F/c (2.26)
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τ(N + ε)θ(N + ε)w1[στcw2/(σ − 1)]−σ
P 1−σ1
+
(N − ε)θ(N − ε)w2[σcw2/(σ − 1)]−σ
P 1−σ2
+(n− 2)τNθ(N)[στcw2/(σ − 1)]
−σ
P 1−σi
= (σ − 1)F/c
Dierentiating this system of equation w.r.t. ε we aim to sign dV1
dε
at the symmetric
point ε = 0.
Note that: (1) at the symmetric point w1 = w2 = 1; (2) by symmetry and denition





and similar equality applies to price indexes; nally, dPi
dε
= 0,
i.e. for any third city (i ̸= 1, 2) the eect of the population increase in city #1 is canceled
out by the eect from exactly same decrease in city #2. Denote the elasticity of any




and totally dierentiate equations (2.25) and
(2.26) with respect to ε we obtain:
(1− σ)(1 + (n− 1)τ 1−σ)EP1 = (1− τ 1−σ)(1 + Eθ + (1− σ)Ew1) (2.27)
σ(1 + (n− 1)τ 1−σ)Ew1 = (1− τ 1−σ)(1 + Eθ + Ew1 + (σ − 1)EP1) (2.28)
We are interested in the elasticity of indirect utility, which can be expressed as EV1 =
Eθ + Ew1 − EP1 . The solution to the system of elasticity equations delivers:
Ew1 − EP1 = (1 + Eθ) 2σ − 1
(σ − 1)
(
σ − 1 + σ 1+(n−1)τ1−σ
1−τ1−σ
)




σ − 1 + σ 1+(n−1)τ1−σ
1−τ1−σ
) ≤ − Eθ
1 + Eθ
.
Recall that θ(N) = 1− k
√






. Substituting Eθ into previous
inequality delivers result (2.11). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. (1) We start with the behavior of Ld(n) when n goes to
innity. Brief inspection reveals that this limit is of type ∞× 0 indeterminacy. However,
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Then, by continuity limn→∞ L
d(n) = 0. This fact can be interpreted as the existence of
some n̄ such that ∀n ≥ n̄ Ld(n) ≤ Ld(1) > 0. By the extreme value theorem, Ld(n) on
interval [1, n̄] attains its maximum Ld∗ (which is nite) and, therefore, it is bounded by
the value of this maximum on the whole interval [1,+∞). Then, for L greater than the
universal critical population Ld∗, the equilibrium (n,N) is unstable for all n.
(2) The proof of the second part is similar. First, applying l'Hospital's rule to the
expression for ϕd(n), it is possible to show that limn→∞ ϕ
d(n) = 0. Further, ϕd(n) is
separated from one for any nal n, and attains some maximum ϕd∗ < 1 at some nite n,
as in the previous argument. Thus, ϕd∗ is separated from 1, so that on the entire interval
[1,+∞) ∋ n any equilibrium (n, L/n) is unstable against dispersion. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. As we have shown in the proof of Proposition 5, critical
Ld(n) approaches zero at a speed 1/n. Therefore, consider the following limit and apply

































σ + 2 + (σ−1)σnϕ
(2σ−1)(1−ϕ)
 = 2(2σ − 1)(1− ϕ)
σ(σ − 1)ϕ
Combining these limits together and applying continuity we obtain limn→∞ n(L
a(n)−
Ld(n)) > 0. This implies that n̄ exists such that ∀n ≥ n̄ La(n) > Ld(n), or equivalently,
there is no L such that La(n) ≤ L ≤ Ld(n), which is the necessary condition for migration
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stable equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9. Let us perform comparative static exercise w.r.t. N1.
Taking elasticity of the equilibrium conditions, we nd
(1− σ)(1 + (n− 1)τ 1−σ)EPnd = 1 + E
θ + (1− σ)Ewnd (2.29)
σ(1 + (n− 1)τ 1−σ)Ewnd = 1 + E
θ + Ewnd + (σ − 1)E
Pn
d (2.30)
Here the subscript d emphasizes that elasticity is perceived by the developer. The
elasticity equations for the stability against agglomeration (2.27) and (2.28) look very
much alike, only with (1 − ϕ) multiplier on the right hand side. Therefore, the costlier
the trade, the more developer stability behavior resembles that of stability against ag-
glomeration. The intuition is straightforward: cities aect each other through trade only.
Therefore, the higher trade costs are, the less impact a developer's city has on other
cities, and therefore, the smaller the developer's mistake in assuming no change in other




(σ − 1)(2σ − 1 + σ(n− 1)ϕ)
(1 + Eθ) + Eθ (2.31)
Straightforward algebra yields the result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10. We start with the case of a wise developer. First, observe




















Second, observe that La(n) is a unimodal function with
argmax
n
La(n) = n̄ =
(σ + 2)(2σ − 1)(1− ϕ)
σ(σ − 1)ϕ
(2.33)





















where the rst inequality follows from n > n̄ and denition of n̄ (2.33) and the second
inequality follows from (2.32). Recall that stability against dispersion requires L(n) <
Ld(n), therefore, wise developer stable equilibrium is possible only on the increasing part
of La(n). Thus, with population L growing, the number of cities n grows as well, and
since La(n)/n is a decreasing function, the city size N declines. Further, La(n) decreases
with the increase in freeness ϕ. Again, because the equilibrium must be on the increasing
part of the curve, decreasing ϕ given L leads to an increase in the number of cities n.
The city size N declines.
Proof for the myopic developer works along the same lines. Q.E.D.
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Chapter 3
Hotelling Meets Chamberlin: Spatial
Monopolistic Competition
Co-authored by Sergey Kokovin and Takatoshi Tabuchi.
3.1 Introduction
Motivation. Addressing consumers' heterogeneity in the markets for dierentiated
products, we observe that individual consumers typically favor dierent ideal goods,
e.g. favorite type of beer or coee  and, further, often choose something dierent from
time to time. In other words, each consumer's love for variety struggles with her love
for ideal product type. This conict results in a non-equal mixture of ideal and non-ideal
varieties in the consumption bundle of an individual. Somewhat similarly, consumers in
a city quite often buy food from the nearest shop but also use other shops from time
to time. Such behavior generates an intersection of the shops' ranges of service. On a
country-wide scale, we also observe intersecting trade areas of various rms, though closer
clients are served more frequently. Overall, in many real markets, the partially-localized
preferences of consumers give rise to partially-localized competition.
Equally important in this respect is the question of the market structure: Why do
some seemingly similar markets show very dierent degree of product dierentiation,
e.g. why is more than half of the beer market in the US covered by only three brands,
whereas no one brand has even ten percent of the beer market in the UK. It is important
to understand which features of the consumer's partially-localized preferences or market
71
geography may account for such dierent outcomes.
These questions are not exactly new in economic theory. Almost simultaneously,
Hotelling (1929) and Chamberlin (1933) introduced two competing ideas: consumers'
ideal points and their love for variety. The subsequent Hotelling-style tradition of mod-
eling spatial markets maintains the homogenous good assumption (see Lancaster (1966),
Salop (1979), Vogel (2008)). In this case, each consumer is served by a single rm, i.e,
ranges of service do not intersect because each rm competes only with its adjacent
neighbor for the borderline consumer. By contrast, Chamberlinian tradition (which be-
came the mainstream market concept after Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) and has taken a central
place in new theories of trade, geography, and growth since then) assumes a horizontally
dierentiated good without space. This makes the ranges of service completely coincid-
ing : every rm competes equally with every other rm. In our view, a representative
consumer's love for variety concept in usual monopolistic competition theory remains
subject to doubts and objections. We believe that the real life love for variety stems
mainly from consumer heterogeneity. We would like to make this intuition explicit, akin
to the theory of product dierentiation under discreet choice (see Anderson et al. (1992)
for a review).
Another question is robustness. Given that the market structure we have in mind
appears to be dierent to those widely studied, would standard theoretical conclusions
remain or change drastically after the introduction of heterogeneous consumers? Does
market equilibrium behave the way we are used to in response to a change in endogenous
variables such as the market size?
Aiming to answer these questions, we introduce a model that lls the gap between
two polar views on competition. The present paper bridges the (free-entry version of)
Hotelling (1929) and Chamberlin (1933) approaches in a simple but general way. It
includes both these polar special cases, diering in essence by two parameters: love for
variety (absent in Hotelling) and distance cost (absent in Chamberlin). Our construction
aims to keep all features of the mainstream monopolistic competition theory present but
to replace the representative consumer with heterogenous consumers. Introducing the
simplest rich model of this kind, we compare it with other models bridging space and
love for variety, and point out various important extensions for subsequent work. At the
center of this paper is the question of how a spatial dimension (consumer heterogeneity)
changes the nature and comparative statics of market competition.
Setting. Consumers are continuously distributed with some given density along a cir-
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cumference, similar to the Salop (1979) model. This space can represent a geographical
space, or a space of consumers' tastes, i.e., ideal points among varieties of the dierenti-
ated good. In contrast to inelastic demand in Salop and discrete-choice papers, here each
consumer combines various quantities of ideal and non-deal varieties in her consumption
bundle, due to love for variety. Consumers are identical in preferences, have the same
(unspecied additive) utility function and income, but dier in their locations. Naturally,
everybody prefers varieties (rms) located closer than those farther away and buys more
of a variety located closer to her ideal point. This feature is described by some cost of
distance linearly introduced into two versions: either as monetary cost to transport the
good or as disutility of distance to ideal point. The former version is better suited for
geographical interpretation of the model (and also for intermediate production goods),
whereas disutility of distance has more bite in a setting with product characteristics space
of consumer goods.
As to (the continuum of) rms, their number and location, unlike in Hotelling, is
not given but endogenous. Following Chamberlin (1933) and Dixit-Stigliz (1977), our
market exhibits free entry and increasing returns in producing a dierentiated good.
Homogeneous rms simultaneously choose their prices and their locations, taking as given
the density of consumers and current local intensity of competition everywhere. Gross
demand of a rm is the aggregate of the demands of all consumers within its range
of service (where distance costs allow for positive demand). Market equilibrium in the
general version of the model consists of three curves in the consumer space: (i) the
density distribution of rms, (ii) their prices, (iii) competition intensity (marginal utility
of money). The volumes of individual demand for all rm-consumer pairs and ranges of
service can be derived from these variables. However, in the basic version of the model
with uniform density of consumers and symmetric (uniform) distribution of rms, such an
equilibrium boils down to three scalars: mass of rms, price, and competition intensity.
Actually, when the circular space of consumers shrinks to a point or distance cost shrinks
to zero, at the limit one arrives at the standard model of monopolistic competition.
Otherwise, the new model enables richer predictions, especially an endogenous range of
service, at least under those utilities which have a nite derivative at zero (choke-price);
for instance linear-quadratic utility. Without a choke-price, e.g. under constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) preferences, the whole consumer space is always served by every
rm.
Results. First, we analyze the basic setting, trying to reveal similar eects of compe-
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tition as in usual monopolistic competition theory (see Zhelobodko et al., 2012, henceforth
ZKPT). Should a growing population make rms more numerous and larger, and simulta-
neously push their prices down? The technical achievement in this direction is convenient
reformulation of the aggregated demand faced by a rm into consumer surplus of ele-
mentary utility at maximal local consumption. Then, the uniform spatial model turns out
equally simple and tractable to usual monopolistic competition. This news may inspire
theorists wishing to expand the usual analysis of international trade to the inuence on
consumer tastes and rms core competencies.
For both versions of our model (monetary cost and disutility of distance) we obtain
general propositions of comparative statics. Namely, under incomplete coverage of space
by a rm's service (choke-price), population growth (e.g., opening trade) always leads to
more numerous rms, higher competition and smaller individual consumption of each va-
riety, but price behavior and rm size both depend on the elasticity of elementary utility.
Under the natural DEU (decreasingly-elastic utility) condition, prices go down, otherwise
the opposite outcome takes place. This outcome reminds us of the necessary and sucient
condition from ZKPT for pro-competitive eect of the market size or trade, which is in-
creasing (in the absolute value) elasticity of the inverse demand function (IED). However,
now IED is replaced by the DEU condition, which appears to be a direct application of
ZKPT to the integrated demand, because of the crucial simplication described. These
eects are similar, which generally supports the robustness of monopolistic competition
modeling: spatial generalization does not destroy it.
Moreover, although the two conditions do not seem to be directly related, intuitive
interpretations of them are strikingly similar: expanding market size generates pro-
competitive eects when demand is not too convex.
However, instead of similarity, a theorist should be more interested in the direction
in which spatial monopolistic competition diers from usual modeling. How does the
heterogeneity of integrated demands change the shape of gross demand function? As we
know, generally, heterogeneity combined with integration makes the demand more convex
(see such a conclusion for income heterogeneity in Osharin et al., 2014). Indeed, consider
a simple example of quadratic elementary utility u(q) = q − 0.5q2 which generates linear
demand function q = 1 − P of total price P = p + t which depends on cost-of-distance
coecient t. One may check that the range of service will be (1− p) /t and the gross
demand of a rm is quadratic: Q = 0.5(1−p)2/t, more convex than initial linear demand.
It is the elasticity and convexity of the gross demand that govern the behavior of rms
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and generates many market eects. So, turning from a usual consumer-homogeneous
monopolistic competition model to a spatial one may essentially change some theoretical
predictions. Upturning this idea, we may say that when empirical estimates of gross
demand are found to be a quadratic function in the form Q = 0.5(1−p)2, then under the
assumption of spatial monopolistic competition, the elementary utility revealed must also
be quadratic, not cubic, as one would conclude assuming spaceless competition. A similar
conclusion applies to numerous econometric estimates of CES demand: the magnitude of
the underlying elementary elasticity of substitution σ between varieties must be dierent
from one reported under the assumption of spaceless competition. Furthermore, in some
cases, introducing space and the related demand convexication may destroy the usual
assumption of concave prot. In this case multiple equilibria arise, as our preliminary
inquiry in this direction suggests.
Second, we analyze the case with complete coverage of space by service. It is neces-
sary not only to include the CES case into the study, but also to be able to show that
usual monopolistic competition is really a limiting case of a spatial one when distance
cost fades away. This case is substantially less tractable. However, we show that, as
expected, as transportation costs diminish to zero, the model converges to the standard
spaceless monopolistic competition model of ZKPT. We also show that the general con-
clusion persists: the market is pro-competitive when demand is not too convex. However,
unfortunately in this case we do not have an exact border line case between two market
modes. It remains an empirical question in which mode  partial coverage or complete
coverage  each particular market operates.
3.2 The Uniform Model
In this section we set up a simplied version of our model. We assume that consumers
are distributed uniformly over a circumference of unit length. A point of the circumference
can be viewed as a geographic location or a specic product in the product characteristic
space. Firms are free to choose any point of the circumference to enter. For now we
constrain our attention to the case where rms are also distributed uniformly over the
circumference. In what follows, we label it a uniform equilibrium. The concept of uniform
equilibria may be criticized, because they need not be stable and because non-uniform
consumer distribution is unlikely to give rise to uniform distribution of rms. However,
without this basic model, more complicated equilibria are dicult to comprehend. More-
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over, to support an approximately-uniform, or at least continuous distribution of rms,
we introduce, in a reduced form, an external dispersion force that pushes one rm away
from another. It represents land prices and other congestion forces common to economic
geography but not modeled here explicitly. In this case, the tendency towards dispersion
of rms looks more plausible.
In what follows we consider two versions of spatial models: (i) monetary cost of
distance and (ii) disutility of distance. In the rst version, the adjustment cost for con-
suming products produced further away from the consumer's location enters the budget
constraint. This formulation is common in economic geography; it is also ts well to
the case when our consumer is actually a rm that consumes some intermediate good,
incurring costs for adjusting the good to t its exact needs. The second version has more
bite in the case of consumption goods; here distance from one's favorite variety has
some disutility value. We now turn to the formal description of our model.
3.2.1 The Model Setup
Consumers and varieties. We assume identical consumers, each possessing one
unit of a numeraire good (for instance, labor). As in Hotelling (1929), any consumer
type is characterized by her bliss point x in some space Ω, i.e., her beloved variety of the
dierentiated good. The types are uniformly distributed with density L along the circular
space of product characteristics, the circumference Ω = [−1/2, 1/2] of length 1 (Salop's
race-track economy is a proxy for long" linear interval). Following the Chamberlinian
tradition, each variety is produced by a single rm and each rm produces single-product.
There is a continuum of rms. A rm's type, denoted y ∈ [−1/2, 1/2] refers to its location
on the circumference, i.e., its targeted type of consumers, whereas (endogenous) density
µy is the measure of rms in the same location. As has been stated, in this section the
density µy ≡ µ > 0 is assumed to be constant at each point y ∈ Ω. In addition, we assume
mill pricing by the rms, i.e. a rm at y charges gate price py for its product. Again,
with our focus on the symmetry, price distribution is also uniform with py ≡ p > 0.
Ranges of service of various rms do intersect with each other, because consumers love
variety. However, they love various varieties unequally. The bliss-point variety is slightly
preferred to other varieties. For instance, one can imagine a consumer occasionally using
many restaurants in her city but preferring not to go too far. More generally, either
adjusting the non-ideal variety to consumer's tastes is costly, or carrying a purchase
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home from a remote shop is costly. Specically, we assume adjustment costs q · τ(θ) for
buying q and carrying it home from distance θ, where τ(·) is an increasing function of
distance, which for the simplicity of exposition we assume to be linear. Hence, remote
varieties will be consumed in smaller amounts. In particular, extremely remote varieties
may become ignored, not consumed. Therefore, in equilibrium each consumer x has an
(endogenous) range of varieties (rm types) that she wishes to buy, θ̂ ∈ (0, 1/2] denotes
the length of the range of service, also constant for every consumer. An equilibrium may
result in a small range θ̂ < 1/2 which means incomplete coverage of the circumference
Ω by each rm's service. Another possibility is complete coverage by service θ̂ = 1/2, in
the case when the cost of distance is small enough to buy products (in dierent quantities)
from all rms.
Now we can formulate the consumer problem. Given the (uniform) price distribution
p and rm distribution µ, the consumer seeks to maximize her utility subject to budget
constraint:



















A consumer at x buying quantity qxy from a rm at y receives direct consumption
utility u(qxy) in both versions of the model. The elementary utility function u(·) is as-
sumed to be increasing, thrice dierentiable and concave, thus, generating love for variety.
In addition, u(0) = 0, i.e. the presence of a variety does not generate any utility if the
consumer does not consume it. This normalization allows for neat representation of the
comparative statics results. Total utility is additive in elementary utilities over the whole
range of varieties. This unspecied additive utility will allow us to relate comparative
statics market eects to features of preferences and to contrast the results with the cur-
rent literature on non-spatial monopolistic competition (see ZKPT). Adjustment cost
function τ(x, y) depends on the distance between x and y and represents either the mon-
etary or utility cost per unit of consumption of worse than ideal variety, by assumption
τ(x, x) = 0. For simplicity, we assume the transportation cost to be linear in distance.
Given that our space is circumference, it implies
τ(x, y) = tmin {|x− y|, 1− |x− y|} .
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In the rst formulation, the costs enter budget constraint, therefore, we refer to this
version as the monetary cost model. In the second version, these costs enter utility
directly, and we refer to that version as the disutility of distance model.
Producers. The solution to the consumer problem gives rise to the location specic
demand functions dxy(py, p, µ), i.e. given the price of variety y and collection of other
prices p and density of rms µ how much product a consumer at x buys from a rm at
y. Each producer takes the demand functions and number of competitors as given and
prices her variety to maximize prot. As is standard in the monopolistic competition
literature, we assume that the producer incurs constant marginal cost m of production
and xed cost F to operate on the market. In addition, we introduce a dispersion force
in a reduced form into the model. We assume that xed cost F = Fy = F (µy) = F (µ) is
a non-decreasing function of the density of rms at y.
In most of our analysis we treat the xed cost component as constant (independent of
the number of rms), assuming that dependency is weak enough not to aect comparative
statics results. Nevertheless, we introduce a dispersion force for two reasons. First, the
dispersion forces are conceptually important, especially in the case relevant to economic
geography. The concentration of the activity in a particular point raises the price of
land and increases congestion costs. Second, on theoretical grounds, the presence of a
dispersion force counters the potential instability of continuous uniform equilibria. The
latter consideration will be especially relevant in future development of the model, since
preliminary results show that continuous equilibria are not always stable.









dxy(py, p, µ)dx− F (µ)
Equilibrium. Entry into the market is free. Because of the entry, prots must vanish
at each location:
π(py, p, µ) = 0.
Symmetric equilibrium is a bundle {p, µ, dxy(py, p, µ)} of price, density of rms and
location-specic demand functions, that satisfy all consumer and producer optimization
conditions, and the free-entry condition. This general denition is valid for both versions
of the model. In the following analysis of each of the setups, we rene the equilibrium
denition accordingly to simplify exposition in each case.
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3.2.2 Monetary Transportation Costs
We begin our analysis of features of the spatial monopolistic competition with the
monetary transportation cost version of our model. First, we derive the demand function.
Standardly, consumer optimization implies:
qxy(u
′(qxy)− λx(p+ τ(x, y))) = 0.
Here, λx is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint of a consumer at x, which
can be interpreted as the intensity of competition for this consumer. Due to symmetry,
λx = λ for all x. From the complimentary slackness of the consumer's optimality condition
it can be seen that if u′(0) is small enough qxy = 0 for some y suciently far from x. On
the other hand, it might be the case that qxy > 0 for every pair x and y (indeed, it has
to be the case, if u′(0) = ∞). We refer to the former as partial coverage, because rms
do not serve each and every consumer, and to the latter as full coverage, by analogous
reasoning. As we show later, this distinction is quite important because the comparative
statics of the equilibrium diers substantially between these two cases. Essentially, the













We start with the analysis of the case of partial coverage of consumers by rms.
Because we consider uniform equilibria when rms are identical up to rotation we can
focus on the rm at y = 0. Let the elementary demand function D(p) = u′−1(p) when-
ever the inverse of marginal utility exists and zero otherwise. With this notation qxy =
D(λx(p+ τ(x, y)), and the rm's prot can be written as:
Π(p, λ) = 2(p−m)L
ˆ θ̂(p)
0
D(λp+ λτ(θ, 0))dθ − F (µ)
When maximizing the prot, producers take intensity of competition λ as given.
Here we use the variable θ = |x − y| of consumer-producer distance, i.e., distance of
any consumer-type θ ∈ [0, θ̂] from a rm located at 0. Aggregate quantity sold by the
rm is the sum of quantities sold to consumers between −θ̂(p) and θ̂(p). Density L
of consumers at each location factorizes the total output of the rm dedicated to all
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consumers everywhere (L is also total population).
An integral of (inverse) derivative can be simplied. Namely, for the case of linear
cost function τ(θ) = tθ we consider D (whose argument runs from minimal price" λp
to maximal price" λp + λtθ̂), and argue that integrating D is the same as integrating
its inverse u′ whose argument runs from 0 to maximum value q0 = D(λp), which is
the maximal purchase occurring near the bliss-point. Intuitively, instead of integrating
quantities over the consumers in the space, we integrate them over the price range.
Technically, this amounts to substitution of variables: q = D(λp + λtθ), or a change of
























which is similar to consumer surplus in spaceless IO models and decreases in p. In
fact, it is the surplus of a consumer located exactly at the rm's location. It must be
noted that this simplied structure of aggregate demand relies on the assumption of linear
transportation costs.
Thus, under linear distance cost τ(θ) = tθ and uniform equilibrium, any producer's
prot can be rewritten without an integral, simply as
Π(p, λ) = (p−m)2L
λt
[u(D(λp))− λpD(λp)]− F (µ). (3.1)




[u(D(λp))− λpD(λp)− (p−m)λD(λp)] = 0 (3.2)
Furthermore, dierentiating the previous expression (3.2) we get the producer's second




[−(p−m)λD′(λp)− 2D(λp)] < 0
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which we assume to hold strictly in equilibrium. Thus, producer's optimality condition
Πp(p, λ) = 0 together with the free entry condition Π(p, λ) = 0 determine equilibrium
pair of price and competition intensity (p, λ). From them, other equilibrium quantities
of interest, i.e. consumption, density of rms and range of service can be obtained via
the consumer's optimal choice and budget constraint discussed above.
Comparative statics. We have characterized equilibrium in the case of partial
coverage. Now we turn to the question of interest: how does the equilibrium react
to changes in market size? In particular, whether increasing market size or decreasing
transportation costs and the associated increase in competition leads to lower prices. In
what follows, we nd it helpful to dene the additional equilibrium variable q0 = D(λp),
which represents the consumption of an ideal variety. The next proposition establishes
that the elasticity of the elementary utility function εu(q) =
qu′(q)
u(q)
plays a dening role in
the comparative statics behavior: decreasing elasticity of utility leads to pro-competitive
eects, whereas increasing εu(q) leads to anti-competitive eects of the increasing market
size.
Before proceeding to the proposition, we would like to address a concern that εu(q),
as dened, is not immune to ane transformations of the elementary utility function.
Given our assumption of separable additive aggregate utility, an ane transformation of
u(·) must not change the equilibrium outcome. However, our normalization assumption
is u(0) = 0, which we used in the derivation of the aggregate demand for the rm's
product. Without it, the result of our comparative statics analysis would depend on the
more cumbersome ε̃u(q) =
qu′(q)
u(q)−u(0) . To ease the notation, we stick to our normalization,
and elasticity of utility as the quantity of interest.
Proposition 11. Consider the version of the model with monetary costs of transportation
and with partial market coverage. Then an increase in the market size L, or a decrease in
the transportation cost t, leads to: (i) an increase in the intensity of competition λ; (ii)
a decrease in purchases of the ideal variety q0; (iii) a decrease (an increase) in the prices
whenever εu(q) is a decreasing (increasing) function. In addition, expanding market size
L leads to increasing µ, i.e. more rms entering the market, and decreasing θ̂, i.e. the
competition being more localized.
Proof. First, observe that L/t enters rm's equilibrium conditions only as a ratio,
therefore, the results for the transportation cost follow immediately from the result for
the market size. Thus, we focus only the market size eects. Now we rewrite the rm's
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rst order and zero prot conditions in (p, q0) instead of (p, λ) variables, using the fact
that λ = u
′(q0)
p
. The rm's rst order condition becomes:




and zero prot condition:
(p−m) 2pL
u′(q0)t




the elasticity of the utility function at q0. With this standard







q0 = F (µ).
Observe that from the rst equation it follows that in equilibrium 1/2 < εu(q0) < 1.


















+ (p−m)2q0 = 0.
Observe that from the rst equation it follows that price p and quantity q0 co-move
when the elasticity of utility is decreasing, and move in the opposite direction when the


















































































































The term in front of the bracket is clearly positive. We can now use the rm's second




+ 2q0 > 0, which is
exactly the bracketed term. Thus, the bracketed term in (3.3) is positive. This implies
that dq0
dL
< 0, i.e. consumption of the ideal variety always decreases with the market size.
The result for the price behavior follows from the discussion above.
To understand the behavior of the intensity of competition λ notice that Π(p, λ) = 0





= − F (µ)/L
− 1
λ




Therefore, the intensity of competition increases with the market size regardless of





= − −F (µ)/t
− 1
λ












F (µ) + (p−m)2L
t
[pD(λp)]
= 1− εu(q0) < 1/2
Thus, the intensity of competition increases when transportation costs decrease. How-
ever, it does not increase too fast: ελt < 1/2 implies that both λt and λ
2t decrease when
transportation costs decrease.
Now, we focus on the cases we nd plausible, i.e. on the decreasing or slowly increas-
ing elasticity of utility. In these cases q0 decreases, thus, λp = u
′(q0) increases. Therefore,
the radius of service θ̂ =
u′0−λp
λt
decreases as market size increases. The case of decreasing
transportation costs is less clear. On the one hand, equilibrium forces, as before, push
the radius of service down, yet at the same time, the mechanical eect of cheaper trans-
portation leads to the expansion of coverage. The direction of the aggregate aect, which
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is the sum of these two (direct and equilibrium) eects, is unclear. The last equilibrium
variable of interest is the number of rms µ. To understand its behavior, we return to




















The integrand does not depend on any equilibrium variables, and at the same time
the upper limit of integration q0 decreases with the market size. Therefore, the entire
integral decreases. In addition, the intensity of competition increases, thus, as expected,
the expanding market size leads to more entry and an increase in the density of rms.
However, as shown before, the intensity of competition does not increase suciently fast
with the decrease in the transportation cost, and λ2t is decreasing. This generates an
ambiguous eect on the density of rms when transportation costs decrease. Q.E.D.
Thus, we have classied markets according to the εu into two categories: those with
DEU react to relative market size pro-competitively (decreasing prices under higher com-
petition), and those with IEU behave anti-competitively. The open question is what case
is more realistic? For instance, under the widely used linear demand, and CARA and
HARA utility functions, elasticity of utility is decreasing. All these preferences generate
similar pro-competitive eects in usual spaceless monopolistic competition as well but
for a dierent reason: they generate increasingly-elastic demand (IED); see ZKPT. In
principle, a combination of properties IED+DEU of demand/utility is widely used and
considered natural but not guaranteed.
These comparative static results generally look intuitive. Indeed, more dense con-
sumer population should entoce more rms to each location. This shift increases local
competition and pushes consumption of each individual variety down, because more va-
rieties become closer and available to the consumer. As a consequence, one would expect
decreasing prices. Indeed, this is really the case under the natural and widely used im-
plicitly DEU assumption. Thus, here increasing or decreasing elasticity of utility governs
prices, unlike increasing or decreasing demand elasticity in ZKPT.
The dierence stems from the fact that now gross demand is the aggregation of the
local demands u′−1 of various consumers (dierent in distance from the producer). Inte-
grating u′−1 can be looked upon as integrating u′, which is why maximizing prot reminds
us of maximizing utility u. Put dierently, what is important for price behavior is the
elasticity of the aggregate demand a rm faces. At the same time, the aggregation of
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heterogeneous demands does not directly inherit properties of individual demands. In
other respects, general explanation of price behavior is the same: a suciently at gross
demand curves generate natural eects, more convex demands enable paradoxical price
behavior in response to growing competition.
Complete coverage
In the case of complete coverage, every rm sells its product to every consumer but,
unlike the ZKPT spaceless model, in dierent quantities. This case is more dicult to
analyze because it is a mixture of two very dierent market operating modes. Intuitively,
assume rst that the transportation cost is very small. Then, the model converges to the
spaceless case, and the comparative statics is governed by the behavior of the elasticity of
individual demands, i.e. marginal utility, as in the ZKPT model. On the other hand, if
the space is just covered, i.e. consumption of the most remote varieties is very small, the
model is basically the same as the model with partial coverage, and comparative statics is
governed by the elasticity of the elementary utility function. Therefore, the comparative
statics in any case in between these will depend on both elasticity of utility and elasticity
of marginal utility. For this reason, here we provide only partial characterization of this
case, focusing on the most popular and arguably natural case: that of not very convex
demand.
To study this case, in addition to the quantity of an ideal variety q0 = D(λp) we
introduce the quantity of the least preferred variety q1 ≡ D(λp + λt0.5). This allows us
to express a rm's gross demand Q in a similar fashion as before, i.e. as a combination
of consumer surpluses:






















[u (q0)− λpq0 − u (q1) + (λp+ λt0.5)q1]
In words, the total demand is proportional to the dierence in consumer surpluses
between the closest and the furthest consumer. Again, this relatively straightforward
representation relies on the linear distance cost. Although this assumption is very re-
strictive, it is not uncommon in the literature. Now, as in the case of partial coverage,
rms' optimal behavior and free entry condition dene the equilibrium in (p, λ) variables.
All other equilibrium quantities of interest can be recovered from them. Indeed, the free
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entry condition requires that in equilibrium:
Π(p, λ) = (p−m)Q(p, λ)− F (µ) = 0
and rm's optimal behavior is characterized by the rst order condition:
Πp = Q(p, λ) + (p−m)
2L
λt
[−λD(λp) + λD(λp+ λt0.5)] = 0
Similarly to the case studied before, consumption of varieties q0 and q1 and density
of rms µ can be derived from (p, λ) using a consumer's optimality condition and budget
constraint. We now formulate our comparative statics result. As we have mentioned, the
analytical complexity of the case precludes complete characterization of the comparative
statics eects. Nevertheless, we show that in the most popular cases, when individual
demand is relatively at, the market behaves pro-competitively.
Proposition 12. In the version of the model with monetary cost of transportation and




Then an increase in the market size L leads to an increase in the intensity of compe-
tition λ. Moreover, if the demand is not very convex, i.e. if the ratio −u′′(q)/u′(q) is
an increasing function, then increasing market size leads to decreasing prices p, and the
market is pro-competitive.
Proof. First, totaly dierentiating free entry condition and using the fact that Πp = 0









[pD(λp)− (p+ t/2)D(λp+ λt/2)]
> 0
where the inequality follows from the fact that pD(p) is a decreasing function whenever
the elasticity of demand is greater than one (i.e. the elasticity of marginal utility is less














Since Πpp < 0 in equilibrium and
dλ
dL
> 0 as established, the sign of the comparative
statics of the price with respect to the market size is determined by the cross derivative
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[−pD(λp) + (p+ t/2)D(λp+ λt/2)]+
+(p−m)2L
λt
[−D(λp) +D(λp+ λt0.5)− λpD′(λp) + (λp+ λt/2)D′(λp+ λt0.5)]
We now rewrite it in terms of variables q0 = D(λp) and q1 = D(λp+ λt/2) using the
fact that D′(p) = 1
u′′(D(p))
:







Since naturally q0 > q1because demand is a decreasing function, and q0u
′(q0) >
q1u
′(q1) since the elasticity of marginal utility is less than one, the rst two terms in
the cross-derivative are negative. The question of the sign of the cross-derivative comes
down to understanding the nature of the ratio of the rst and second derivatives of the
utility function. Whenever u
′(q)
u′′(q)
is an increasing function, i.e. the elementary utility
function exhibits increasing absolute risk aversion, the last term is also negative and the
comparative statics are pro-competitive, i.e. prices decrease with increasing market size
and competition. It is worth noting that increasing absolute risk aversion corresponds to
low convexity demands, i.e. less convex than demand generated by CARA utility func-
tion. Furthermore, this condition is only sucient and not necessary for pro-competitive
eects. Indeed, even if the last term is positive it is not guaranteed to dominate the two
other terms. Q.E.D.
3.2.3 Model with Disutility of Distance
Consumers and varieties. We now study an alternative formulation of the model.
Instead of bearing monetary cost for transporting varieties produced elsewhere to their
consumption point, consumers experience disutility from consumption of varieties dier-
ent from their ideal variety". In other words, transportation costs now enter the utility
function rather then the budget constraint. In all other respects the setup is the same as












Here again θ̂ ∈ (0, 1/2] is her range of consumption, with θ̂ = 1/2 representing
the case of consumption of all present varieties (full coverage). For a symmetric model,
studying location x ≡ 0 or any other makes no dierence, and instead of absolute location
we focus on the distance between consumer and producer θ. As before, denoting the
demand function D(·) ≡ u′−1(·), solution to the consumer problem implies that demand
for a variety from θ, whenever positive, is given by qθ = D(λpθ + tθ), where λ is the
Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint, i.e. marginal utility of money and, at the
same time, intensity of competition. Now we can observe the main dierence between
the two setups: since the cost of the mismatch between consumer and producer locations
are now non-monetary, they are not multiplied by the marginal utility of money in the
demand function. In other words, there is no need for the additional step of translating"
monetary cost into utility units.
Producers. As before, there is a continuum of producers, and each producer takes









D(λp+ tθ)dθ − F (µ).
The producer's problem is similar to the monetary transportation cost case. We simplify
the objective function using the change of integration axes: instead of integrating over
locations, we integrate consumption over prices. That gives rise to a relatively simple
representation of aggregate demand. Then, in the case of partial coverage θ̂ < 1/2, any
producer's prot can be rewritten as
Π(p, λ) = 2(p−m)L
t
[u(D(λp))− λpD(λp)]− F (µ)
Analogously for the case of full coverage θ̂ = 1/2:
Π(p, λ) = 2(p−m)L
t
[u(D(λp))− λpD(λp)− [u(D(λp+ t/2))− (λp+ t/2)D(λp+ t/2)]]
−F (µ)
Equilibrium. We allow rms to relocate in space and enter/exit the market. Thereby,
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in equilibrium, prot must vanish at each location: Π(p, λ) = 0. The free entry condition
along with the rm's optimality condition denes equilibrium in (p, λ) variables. All
other equilibrium variables can be derived from these two variables using the consumer's
optimality condition and budget constraint.
Symmetric equilibrium is a bundle (p, µ, λ, θ̂) ∈ R4+ including the price, mass of rms,
marginal utility of income, and radius of service that satisfy consumer and producer
optimization conditions, free-entry, and budget constraint.
Characterizing the equilibrium. We start by characterizing the equilibrium in
the case of only partial coverage θ̂ < 1/2. First, observe that the rst and second order
condition for prot maximization essentially do not dier between the two versions of the
model. Indeed, the only dierence between a rm's objective function in the two cases
is the multiplier λ in the variable part, which is treated by the producers as exogenous.
This observation allows for the straightforward characterization of equilibrium in variables
(p, λ) through the prot maximization and free entry conditions:
u(D(λp))
λD(λp)
= 2p−m, 2(p−m) [u(D(λp))− λpD(λp)] = tF (µ)
L
The only dierence from the previous case is an absence of multiplier λ in the free
entry condition. This relatively simple characterization of the equilibrium allows us to
study the comparative statics with respect to the market size and disutility cost.
Proposition 13. Consider the version of the model with disutility cost and with partial
market coverage. Then an increase in the market size L or a decrease in the transportation
cost t leads to: (i) an increase in the intensity of competition λ; (ii) a decrease in the
purchase of the ideal variety q0; (iii) a decrease (an increase) in the prices when εu(q)
is a decreasing (increasing) function. In addition, expanding market size L leads to the
competition being more localized viewed as the decrease in the coverage θ̂.
Proof. We start again by noticing that market size L and disutility cost t enter the
free entry condition as a ratio. Therefore, the comparative statics eects on prices and
intensity competition are symmetric. We use the rm's second order condition, which is







We again study the equilibrium through quantities, and make use of the fact that con-
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sumption of a variety produced by the closest rm is q0 = D(λp), and λp = u
′(q0). The
zero prot and free-entry conditions become
u(q0)
q0u′(q0)
= 2−m/p, (p−m) [u(q0)− q0u′(q0)]L = tF (µ)/2



















+ [u(q0)− q0u′(q0)] (p−m) = 0
Again, price and quantity co-move when the elasticity of utility is decreasing, and











= − [u(q0)− q0u
′(q0)] (p−m)
L
The right hand side of it is clearly negative. We now study the the bracketed term
on the left hand side, using the fact that from the rm's rst order condition, it follows














































































































In the last expression the outer term is clearly positive since u′′(·) < 0, and the
bracketed term is positive because of the rm's second order condition. Altogether, this
implies that dq0
dL
< 0, i.e. consumption of an ideal variety decreases with increasing market
size. The result for the prices follows from the discussion above.
The next parameter of interest is the range of service θ̂. To understand its behavior
consider the demand there: D(λp + tθ̂) = 0, or alternatively λp + tθ̂ = u′(0) = u0. The





It immediately follows that, following the change in the market size L, behavior of the
range of service replicates that of the consumption of ideal variety q0. Hence, the range
of service decreases with market size in the case of the increasing elasticity of utility. Put
dierently, when elasticity of utility is an increasing function, an increase in the market
size leads to more localized competition. Finally, to show that intensity of competition











and intensity of competition increases. Q.E.D.
Thus, we have shown that both versions of the model exhibit similar comparative
statics: the market is pro-competitive whenever the elasticity of utility is a decreasing
function. The other variables behave naturally: an increase in the market size inten-
sies competition, leads to smaller consumption of each variety, and to more localized
competition.
The intuition behind the result remains the same independently of the model for-
mulation. The pro- or anti-competitive behavior of the market is determined by the
increasing or decreasing elasticity of the aggregate demand. However, the aggregate de-
mand of the heterogeneous consumers does not inherit the properties of their individual
demand, rather the behavior of the elasticity of aggregate demand depends on higher
order properties of individual demands.
Characterizing the equilibrium with full coverage. Now we consider prop-
erties and comparative statics of equilibrium when coverage is full. As in the version
of the model with monetary transportation cost, this case is substantially less analyti-
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cally tractable. Start with the case when the reason for a consumer to buy from each
and every rm is suciently low transportation cost. Then, using the rst order Taylor
approximation, we can write
u(D(λp+ t/2))− (λp+ t/2)D(λp+ t/2) = u(D(λp))− λpD(λp) +−D(λp) t
2
+ o(t)
Substituting it into prot denition for the case of full coverage and using only the
rst order approximation, we eectively obtain an approximation of the prot function:
Π(p, λ) = (p−m)LD(λp)− F (µ).
In other words, the model collapses to a case with no distance, as studied in ZKPT.
As they show, in this case, the behavior of the elasticity of marginal utility (rather than
utility itself) denes the direction of comparative statics eects with respect to market
size. This observation sheds light on the model behavior between the two extreme cases,
i.e. when rms serve all consumers but the disutility from shopping far away is not
suciently small.
Now we turn to formal analysis of the comparative statics under full coverage. Denote
q0 = D(λp) the consumption of the ideal variety and q1 = D(λp+ t/2) the consumption
of the least liked variety, i.e. one produced at the opposite point of the circumference.
Dierentiating prot with respect to price, we obtain the rm's rst order condition:
Πp(p, λ) = 2
L
t
[u(q0)− λpq0 − [u(q1)− (λp+ t/2)q1]]− 2(p−m)
L
t
λ(q0 − q1) = 0
The transparent complexity of the model in the case of full coverage precludes full
characterization of the comparative statics. Nevertheless, it is still possible to guarantee
pro-competitive behavior of the market when demand is not too convex.
Proposition 14. Consider the version of the model with monetary cost of transportation
and with complete market coverage. Then an increase in market size L leads to an
increase in the intensity of competition λ. Moreover, if the demand function D(·) is
concave, or marginal cost of production m = 0, then increasing market size generates
leads to decreasing prices p, and the market is pro-competitive.
Proof. As before, we begin comparative statics analysis with respect to the market
size assuming that congestion is suciently small, so that we can disregard the indirect
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eect stemming from entry or exit of rms. In this case, one can write down the free
entry condition as:

















−F (µ) = 0.

















In other words, as intuitively expected, an increase in the market size leads to an
increase in the intensity of competition measured as the marginal utility of money.
To understand the eect of increasing market size on the pricing behavior of rms,
consider now the rm's rst order condition written as:
Πp(p, λ, L) = 2
L
t
[u(D(λp))− λpD(λp)− [u(D(λp+ t/2))− (λp+ t/2)D(λp+ t/2)]]−
−2(p−m)L
t
λ(D(λp)−D(λp+ t/2)) = 0




λ(q0 − q1)− 2(p−m)
L
t
λ2(D′(λp)−D′(λp+ t/2)) < 0
Now, we totally dierentiate the rm's rst order condition with respect to market








As Πpp < 0,
dλ
dL
> 0 as established, and linearity in L implies that ΠpL = LΠp = 0,
the direction of the comparative statics is determined by the reaction of marginal prot
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to changes in the intensity of competition Πpλ:
dp
dL
∝ Πpλ = −2(2p−m)
L
t




The rst term here is clearly negative. The sign of the second term depends on the
shape of demand function. In case of concave or linear demand D′′(·) ≤ 0 and the second
term is negative as well, implying unambiguously that in response to an increase in the
market size, prices go down. Alternatively, if demand is convex, the second term is
positive and the total eect is ambiguous. Whether the second term outweighs the rst
depends on how strong the convexity of demand is. However, the general conclusion of
the literature on the role of demand shapes persists; concave and not too convex demands
generate pro-competitive eects  prices go down with the increase in market size and
competition  whereas very convex demands generate anticompetitive market outcomes.
Alternatively, if the marginal cost m = 0, then Πp(λ, p) is a function of the product
λp only. Therefore, in equilibrium the product is constant independently of the market
size L, and the behavior of the price is exactly opposite to the behavior of the intensity
of competition, and the market is always pro-competitive. Q.E.D.
The conditions elicited in Proposition 14 are strong. However, they are only sucient
but not necessary. In fact, from the continuity argument we expect the market also
to behave pro-competitively in the presence of small marginal cost and low convexity
demands.
3.3 Conclusion
This paper attempts to bridge two traditions in modeling markets with horizontal
product dierentiation. We develop a model that features both product space charac-
teristics in the spirit of Hotelling (1929) and monopolistic competition as introduced by
Chamberlin (1933). The preference structure we employ allows consumers in the model
to have an ideal product and love for variety at the same time, which leads to the con-
sumption of a wider range of varieties of products but in dierent quantities. In doing so
we aimed to capture the idea that in real life consumers shop in a limited number of shops
and consume a particular type of a given product most of the time, but occasionally de-
viate. In addition, the model formalizes the idea that love for variety in aggregate stems
not only from personal preference for variety, but also from heterogeneity of preferences,
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and therefore might seem stronger on the aggregate than the individual level.
Our main contribution is to show that despite its cumbersome structure, this approach
can still be tractable in a number of important cases. We characterize a uniform equi-
librium when product space is a circumference, i.e. symmetric, consumers are uniformly
distributed across it, and the cost of a mismatch between the location of a consumer
and product are linear, either in monetary or in utility terms. We show that in all ver-
sions of the model under the most natural and widely used preference shapes  when
demand is not too convex  the market behaves pro-competitively: in response to an
increasing market size, prices decrease. At the same time convex demands can gener-
ate anti-competitive market eects. In other words, our work reinforces the conclusion of
spaceless monopolistic competition theory on the connection between comparative statics
eects and the shape of consumer preferences.
The other important question that remains outside the scope of this paper is what
spacial distribution of rms may arise under the market structure we study. Throughout
the paper we have focused on the uniform distribution of rms which can be intuitively
understood as the maximal dierentiation equilibrium. However, can it be the case that
free entry of rms can lead to standardization of products in the characteristic space
and minimal dierentiation as was believed by Hotelling? Can competition of rms per
se lead to the agglomeration of rms in space? More formally, this is the question of
multiplicity of equilibriua and stability of the uniform equilibrium. Our preliminary
inquiry shows that indeed, under very at demands, maximum dierentiation is unstable
and standardization occurs as an equilibrium outcome, but the general result is yet to
come. We believe that further clarication of this question is an important issue and
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3.A Appendix 3
Here we quantify the notion of small enough congestion force of rm agglomeration in
the space, for the case of disutility of distance and incomplete coverage. The other cases
can be studied analogously.
First, denote elasticity of utility function as qu
′(q)
u(q)
= εu(q). Then the rm's rst order
condition can be rewritten as 1
εu(q0)
= 2 − m
p
. Concavity of u(·) together with u(0) = 0
imply that εu(q) < 1. In addition, a positive solution to the price maximization problem
implies εu(q0) > 1/2 in equilibrium. We start with the budget constraint combined with













Putting together the rm's rst order condition, free entry condition and budget































Using this equation as an implicit function q0(L) and taking derivatives with respect































The last term in this equation is the indirect eect stemming from congestion force.
First, note that in the case of the decreasing elasticity of utility, the indirect eect re-
inforces the direct eect of the market size through increasing competition. Therefore,
independently of the size of the F ′(·), the consumption of ideal variety is always decreas-
ing with the market size. However, in the case of increasing elasticity of utility, an indirect
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eect can potentially have a dierent sign, therefore, the requirement that congestion is
not too strong, i.e. xed costs do not rise too fast, can be formally expressed as:
2m
2εu(q0)− 1
Abs
{
[u(q0)− u′(q0)q0] ε′u(q0)
(2εu(q0)− 1)2
+ u′′(q0)q0(1− εu(q0))
}
>
>
t2
2mL
F ′(µ)
1
εu(q0)(u(q0)− u′(q0)q0)
Abs
{
ε′u(q0)
εu(q0)
+
u′′(q0)q0(2εu(q0)− 1)
(u(q0)− u′(q0)q0)
}
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